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the safe direction, and β is the line-of-sight angle. Note that β > π
2
so that the
system is constrained to remain outside of an avoid cone (red) centered on −ĉ. . . 77
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Summary
This dissertation investigates the problem of safety-critical control for complex cyber-physical
systems, with an emphasis on numerical optimization and autonomy applications in the space
domain. The first part of the work presents a tutorial on safety and Run Time Assurance (RTA). A
set-based approach is presented for specifying mission constraints, and safety is formalized in the
context of set invariance. Next, the research investigates the topic of RTA, which relates to a control
system architecture where a performance-oriented controller is augmented with a safety-oriented
element that filters the control signal in such a way that guarantees safety. The main contributions
of this work are presented in the latter half of this thesis, and these relate to the application of
optimization-based RTA techniques to problems in the space domain.
Autonomous rendezvous proximity operations and docking (ARPOD) is considered under
proximity, collision-avoidance, and speed constraints. Natural motion trajectories are used to iden-
tify a set of passively safe parking orbits under the Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill dynamics, and a mixed
integer programming approach is used to generate safety-constrained optimal transfer trajectories
to this set. The formulation is encoded into an RTA framework.
The safety problem is considered for a torque-controlled spacecraft in free rotational motion,
subject to line-of-sight constraints. A nondeterministic dynamics model is considered and an RTA
filter is constructed that relies on online computation of forward reachable sets around a recovery
maneuver. The approach utilizes recent results from reachability theory in addition to optimization-
based computation of invariant sets. Safety guarantees exist when a disturbance torque is bounded.
The practicality of the approach is demonstrated with an application on a hardware testbed.
Finally, the research studies the topic of harnessing collisional behavior for free-flying space-
craft. A framework is proposed for collision-inclusive trajectory optimization. Experimental com-
parisons of trajectories with and without collision-avoidance requirements demonstrate the capa-
bility of the collision-inclusive strategy to achieve significant performance improvements in real-
istic scenarios. Additionally, a safety application is considered, and the planner is utilized for the




Intelligent cyber-physical systems (CPSs) offer an enormous amount of economic and scientific
value. This value is at its core tied to the ability to automate complex and meaningful decisions.
However, in order to make good decisions, it is first necessary to avoid bad ones. Likewise, in
order to reap the benefits of intelligent decision making, it is necessary that the possibility of
taking harmful actions be eliminated. Fundamentally, safety-critical control relates to the problem
of avoidance in control and decision making. Results in this area require a high degree of formality
and technical rigor. This rigor is achieved through mathematical abstraction, and it is necessitated
by the fact that exceedingly rare events can negate the accumulated positive value of a technology
that performs well nominally. Specifically, for the class of systems that are safety-critical, errors
may be catastrophic; e.g. resulting environmental damage, significant financial loss, or loss of life.
The need for a strong safety-critical control framework is greater than ever. The emergence
of new technologies for embedded systems has enabled increasingly high-level decisions to be
performed by on-board software. As intelligent systems begin to interact with the world in more
complex ways, they become increasingly vulnerable to error. This complexity often precludes the
ability to prove correctness. Furthermore, as tasks traditionally performed by human operators
continue to be automated, the burden of safety assurance shifts ever further toward the designer of
the system. For mobile systems with high degrees of autonomy, safety poses the single greatest
obstacle to widespread and practical utilization in the real world. In order to enable the seamless
integration of autonomous robotics and other advanced mobile systems, it is necessary to develop
methods for enforcing safety that are both rigorous enough to inspire the confidence required for
real-world deployment, and scalable enough to the complexities of real-world systems.
1
1.2 Run Time Assurance
A controller design task generally consists of finding a control policy that maximizes some per-
formance criteria while ensuring safety of the system. However, system performance and safety
are often conflicting goals, and the need to solve both problems in tandem adds a great amount of
complexity to the design process. A crucial observation is that the two problems can be decoupled.
Run Time Assurance (RTA) presents an approach to control design whereby a performance-driven
controller is augmented with a safety-driven element that preempts unsafe actions when necessary.
Ideally, this element is minimally invasive to the desired input from the performance-driven con-
troller, leaving the desired input unmodified whenever it is not compromising to system safety.
This process allows for guarantees on safety to be made independently of the structure of the ob-
jectives of the primary performance-driven controller. Importantly, it provides a means for safety
constraints to be enforced in systems being controlled by human operators. By separating safety
and performance concerns, both problems are greatly simplified. A key benefit is that this approach
allows for control laws for safety-critical CPSs to be complex, adaptive, and readily modified, with-
out the need to repeat a rigorous verification process, and without compromising on safety. The
research in this thesis follows an RTA paradigm, and as such, the results are complementary to
those in performance-driven research.
1.3 Numerical Optimization
Numerical optimization provides an attractive framework for reliable control and decision mak-
ing in safety-critical systems. Efficient off-the-shelf optimization interfaces allow users to take
advantage of state-of-the art algorithms to solve constrained optimization problems specified at a
high level. Furthermore, the algorithms can be formally verified [1, 2]. Optimization is utilized
for safety-critical control in a number of ways. Model-Predictive Control (MPC) problems seek to
synthesize safe inputs directly at the planning stage by optimizing a performance objective subject
to a set of defined constraints on the state and input. Constraints may be added to model physi-
2
cal properties of the system (e.g. the equations of motion, actuator limitations), or they may be
imposed by the designer to ensure that a safety specification is met (e.g. collision avoidance). Op-
timization may additionally be used in an RTA framework, where a verified safety filter is used
to augment the potentially unsafe inputs of an unverified performance-driven controller in a way
that ensures safety of the system when necessary. In this case, constraints restrict the input to the
subset of available inputs that are safe. One may also consider the case where safety is reflected in
the objective, such as when hard safety constraints are softened, meaning that constraint violations
are allowed, but penalized in the objective function.
1.4 Mixed Integer Programming
Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) refers to an optimization problem that includes both real and
integer-valued decision variables. This type of problem provides a very general framework for cap-
turing many types of practical control objectives. Specifically, the inclusion of integer variables
allows for both the expression of discrete decisions (e.g. modes or assignments) and the encoding
of non-convex constraints (e.g. obstacle avoidance). This makes MIP naturally well suited to op-
timizing the actions over systems governed by interdependent dynamic modes, logical statements,
and operational constraints [3, 4]. Though MIP may refer to any optimization problem involving
both real and integer decision variables, the most commonly considered case entails an objective





s.t. Dczc +Dbzb ≤ g, Aczc + Abzb = h
zc ∈ Rnc , zb ∈ {0, 1}nb , z = [zc, zb]
(1.1)
where, Dc ∈ Rm×nc , Db ∈ Rm×nb , g ∈ Rm, Ac ∈ Rp×nc , Ab ∈ Rp×nb , h ∈ Rp, and the constraint
inequality symbols are element-wise. Note that the above constraints may be interpreted as a single
conjunction of m inequality constraints and p equality constraints.
While the problem (1.1) is not convex in general, one can in principle compute globally optimal
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solutions whenever J is convex by solving a finite number of convex subproblems [5]. This is
apparent when one notes that the problem is convex for each fixed combination of assignments to
the integer variables. For example, a brute force approach to solving (1.1) is to enumerate all 2nb
integer values of zb, and compare the optimal costs of each feasible subproblem [4]. By far the
most common choice for solving MIP problems in practice is the branch-and-bound algorithm [6],
which searches a tree with different integer settings for each branch. Branch-and-bound is known
to return a globally optimal solution upon termination. While binary integer programming is in
general NP-complete [7, 8], and indeed the worst-case computation time of branch-and-bound is
exponential in the number of binary variables1, solutions to MIP problems can readily be found
with good average-case performance using off-the-shelf optimization software; e.g. CPLEX [10],
Gurobi [11], or MOSEK [12].
In addition to the ability to be solved to global optimality with certain objective functions, the
attractiveness of MIP derives from the fact that mixed integer constraints can express a rich col-
lection of practical specifications. Of central importance here is the procedure [3] for encoding
propositional logical connectives as mixed integer linear constraints. That is, given a set of spec-
ifications consisting of mixed integer inequalities separated by logical connectives, there exists a
separate set of mixed integer inequalities that is satisfied exactly when the first set of specifications
is satisfied. For example, let x ∈ X ⊂ Rn, then the disjunction
aT1 x ≤ b1 ∨ aT2 x ≤ b2 (1.2)
is equivalent to the mixed integer linear constraints,
aT1 x ≤ b1 +Mz1, aT2 x ≤ b2 +Mz2, z1 + z2 ≤ 1 (1.3)
1When J(z) is linear or quadratic, complexity is polynomial in the number of real variables [9]. Polynomial-
time complexity also holds true for semi-definite programs (SDPs) and second-order cone programs (SOCPs). It is
interesting to note that for the case of linear programs, the Simplex algorithm is more commonly used, which has an
exponential worst case complexity but has better average case performance. See [1] for more on this topic.
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where, z1, z2 ∈ {0, 1}, and M ∈ R>0 is defined to be sufficiently large such that the constraint is
always satisfied when the integer variable that it is attached to is assigned a value of one; e.g. in the
above case we setM ≥ maxx∈X (aT1 x−b1, aT2 x−b2). In practice,M should be chosen carefully, as
excessively large values may decrease computational efficiency or introduce numerical error. The
above procedure is commonly referred to in the literature as the big-M method. It provides a basis
for representing more complex constraints such as obstacle avoidance. In addition, mixed integer
linear constraints have been shown to equivalently represent specifications in Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL) [13], and Signal Temporal Logic (STL) [9, 14]. As a result of this, the problem of
synthesizing optimal control laws subject to high-level temporal logic specifications may be posed
as a MIP.
1.5 Modelling Cyber-Physical Systems
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) feature computing devices that interact with the physical world
via actuators and sensors [15]. Mathematical models provide a means for interacting with CPSs
through abstraction of real-world behavior, and these models may be defined at varying levels of
complexity based on the contrasting needs of accurately predicting system behavior and conducting
mathematical analysis. In this setting, CPSs are modeled as dynamical systems; hereafter the
variable x ∈ X ⊆ Rn denotes the state vector of the system model and the variable u ∈ U ⊂ Rm
denotes a bounded control input, where X is the set of all possible system states and the set U is
the admissible set of controls, determined a priori by the actuation constraints of the real-world
system.
Continuous-time system models appear as systems of ordinary differential equations as in
ẋ = Fc(x, u), (1.4)
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and discrete-time system models appear as state-update maps as in
x+ = Fd(x, u). (1.5)
While the computational elements responsible for the control of a CPS live in a discrete world,
the physical laws of motion tend to take the form of ordinary differential equations. In many
cases, systems of the form (1.5) are obtained from discretizing equations of the form (1.4) over
the controller update period. A natural generalization is to consider hybrid systems that combine
continuous-time and discrete-time elements [16, 17].
1.5.1 Nondeterministic Systems
It is important to observe that (1.4) and (1.5) are only models, and real-world systems generally
deviate from their models. When this deviation is significant, safety guarantees derived from the
models are invalid. One method for addressing this limitation is to instead consider a nondeter-
ministic model that explicitly considers uncertainties that account for the deviation between the
real-world system and the deterministic models presented in (1.4) or (1.5). This may be achieved
by augmenting the above systems with a bounded nondeterminisitc input variablew(t) ∈ W ⊂ Rp,
which takes an unknown value within the domain W , and may be used to model parametric un-
certainty, external noise perturbations, etc. Continuous-time nondeterministic models appear as in
ẋ = Gc(x, u, w), (1.6)
and discrete-time nondeterministic system models appear as in
x+ = Gd(x, u, w). (1.7)
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1.5.2 Admissible Control of Cyber-Physical Systems
Safety control schemes must conform to the boundaries of admissible control. That is, a control
law can only be realized on a physical system if its outputs are bounded to a set of signals that
respect the actuation constraints of that system. A feedback control law u denotes a mapping to
Rm from either the state domain or an augmentation of the state domain. For instance, in the
context of RTA, many primary control laws will take the form u : X → Rm, while RTA control
laws will generally take the form u : X × Rm → Rm, and either representation can be extended
to include explicit dependence on time. Control laws are said to be admissible when their range is
the admissible input set U , e.g. u : X → U or u : X × Rm → U .
Any control law u can be made admissible via composition with a saturation (also called clamp-
ing) function. A saturation function σ : Rm → U is such that σ(u) is approximately equal to u
when u is in the interior of U and σ(u) is approximately the projection of u onto the boundary of
U when u is outside of U . There are two main approaches: (i) hard clamping, where the saturation
function σ(u) = u for all u ∈ U and σ(u) is otherwise a projection onto the boundary ∂U , and (ii)
smooth clamping, whereby σ takes the form of a differentiable function that such that σ(u) ≈ u
for u ∈ U .
Example 1.5.1. For the case of a scalar input andU = [−1, 1] ⊂ R, then σ1(u) = max(−1,min(1, u))
is a hard clamping function while σ2(u) = tanh(u), σ3(u) = 2π tan(
π
2
u), σ4(u) = u(1 + u2)−1/2,
and σ5(u) = tanh(u+ 0.5u3) are examples of smooth clamping functions. 
1.6 Safety and Invariance of Cyber-Physical Systems
In a colloquial context, safety means freedom from harm or danger. For safety critical systems,
safety is freedom from conditions that would, in a worst-case environment, lead to an unacceptable
loss, such as a loss of control, physical damage to the system under control, loss of human life,
human injury, property damage, environmental pollution, or failure of the mission [18, 19]. In the
context of a controlled dynamical system, safety is a characterization of the state of the system
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and its evolution. While alternate approaches to forming safety specifications exist (e.g. temporal
logic), this research focuses specifically on set invariance requirements derived from static prop-
erties on the state. Specifically, safety properties are specified with state constraints, and safety
relates to whether a particular initial condition will lead to the safety constraints being satisfied for
all time.
Safety constraints in this research are defined with inequality constraints on a function of the
state. In particular, we consider ϕi : Rn → R for i ∈ {1, ...,M}, where M is the number of
safety constraints and it is required that always ϕi(x) ≥ 0 for each i. Though contextual, these
constraints are usually made to reflect some form of harmful configuration, as described above. The
set of states that satisfy all of the safety constraints is referred to as the constraint set —sometimes
called the allowable set or the constraint space— and is given by
CA := {x ∈ Rn |ϕi(x) ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}}. (1.8)
The construction of the constraint set is demonstrated in the following example.
Example 1.6.1. Consider a wingman aircraft with position (xW, yW) flying co-altitude in forma-
tion with a lead aircraft with position (xL, yL) and the requirement is that the two aircraft never go
within 30 meters of each other. A constraint set over the states x = [xL, yL, ẋL, ẏL, xW, yW, ẋW, ẏW]T
is given by:
CA = {x ∈ R8 |
√
(xL − xW)2 + (yL − yW)2 − 30 ≥ 0}. (1.9)

Importantly, the identification of the constraint set is only half of the story, as there may exist
states that obey the safety constraints at a given time, but that inevitably lead to violations in the
future. For example, in the aircraft case it is possible for the wingman aircraft to have just more
than 30 m separation with the lead aircraft initially, but be traveling too fast to to avoid a collision.
Though a state may exist in the constraint set CA at a given time, it is not “safe” (in any meaningful
sense of the word) if it inevitably leads to a departure from the set in the future. Hence, a definition
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of safety must encode additional information relating to the whether the safety constraints will
continue to be satisfied for all time with a particular control law, and subject to a particular set of
dynamics and actuation constraints.
Informally, a system is safe when starting from a particular initial condition if the state is
bounded to CA for all time. This concept is formalized with the notion of set invariance:
Definition 1.6.1 (forward invariance). A closed set S is forward invariant with respect to a dy-
namical system if:
x(t0) ∈ S =⇒ ∀ t ≥ t0, x(t) ∈ S. (1.10)
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That is, a set is forward invariant if any trajectory starting in that set will stay in that set for
all time. Furthermore, trajectories may flow into the boundary of a forward invariant set, but not
outwards. Using this definition, safety is defined as follows:
Definition 1.6.2 (safety). A set of states CS ⊂ X is said to be safe with respect to a dynamical sys-
tem, a control law, and a constraint set CA, if that set is a forward invariant subset of the allowable
set. That is, if CS ⊆ CA and x(t0) ∈ CS =⇒ ∀ t ≥ t0, x(t) ∈ CS. Furthermore, if CS is a safe set,
then any state in CS is said to be a safe state. 4
In addition, control laws are said to be safe when they render some nonempty subset of the
constraint space forward invariant. It is generally desirable that the safe set to be as large as
possible. However, it is generally not possible to find an admissible control law that will render CA
itself forward invariant.
It is important to note that forward invariance, and by extension safety, are properties of the
closed-loop system and are not defined in absence of a controller. The existence, size, and shape of
a safe set are all dependent on the controller. The question of whether it is possible to find a control
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Figure 1.1: Safe set CS and constraint set CA topology for explicit (left) and implicit (right) cases.
Definition 1.6.3 (control invariance). A closed set S ⊆ X is said to be control invariant (also
called viable) with respect to a dynamical system and admissible control set U if there exists an
admissible control law that renders it forward invariant. 4
The largest control invariant subset of CA is known as the viability kernel [20]. Intuitively, the
viability kernel is the largest achievable safe set, and it forms the boundary between the states for
which it is and is not possible to find a control law that will keep the system safe for all time. A
fact that will become important in later sections is that control invariant sets are forward invariant
under controllers that take the form of certain optimization-based procedures.





where the state vector x = [x1, x2]T ∈ R2 is composed of a position state x1, and a velocity state
x2, and u ∈ [−1, 1] is the acceleration. The safety constraint ϕ(x) = −x1 ≥ 0 is imposed on the
10
system, reflecting the requirement that the system avoid collision with an object located at x1 = 0.
The constraint set is
CA := {x ∈ R2 | − x1 ≥ 0}. (1.12)




−2x1 − x22 if x2 > 0
−x1 if x2 ≤ 0.
(1.13)
The unsafe states in the constraint set CA \ CS represent states for which a future collision is in-
evitable. Intuitively, x2 =
√
−2x1 represents the maximum safe velocity at x1. If this approach
speed is exceeded, then there will not be sufficient distance to stop before a collision occurs. This
result is made apparent by considering the flow of the system under a recovery maneuver u = −1,
which applies maximum control away from the obstacle. It can be seen that CS is a forward in-
variant set under this control law. Figure 1.2 shows a depiction of the described sets, and the flow
under various inputs.

Implicit and Explicit Definitions of the Safe Set
Given a constraint set CA and an admissible control law u : X → U , the question arises of how
one can determine if a given state x ∈ X is safe. In many cases, the set of safe states CS can be
identified explicitly with a functional representation; e.g.
CS = {x ∈ Rn |h(x) ≥ 0}, (1.14)
with h : Rn → R. In this case, checking whether x ∈ CS is equivalent to checking whether h(x) ≥
0. The safe set boundary may be determined in a number of ways, such as through Lyapunov ar-
guments or reachability analysis. Additionally, for continuous-time systems as in (1.4), Nagumo’s
11
Figure 1.2: Phase plot for double integrator system with u = −1, 0, 1. The viability kernel is
shaded green, collision states are shaded red, and the inevitable collision states are shaded purple.
theorem states that, under appropriate regularity assumptions on f , ub, and h, a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for invariance of a candidate set CS as in (1.14) is ∂h∂x(x)
TFc(x, ub(x)) ≥ 0 for all x
such that h(x) = 0 [21], and thus Nagumo’s theorem can be used to verify that a candidate safe set
is invariant. Moreover, it is possible to consider nondeterministic effects through the identification
of sets that are robustly forward invariant; i.e. that are forward invariant under any realization of a
nondeterminism.
Example 1.6.3. Consider the double integrator system (1.11), now paired with the constraint set
CA := {x ∈ R2 | 1−‖x‖∞ ≥ 0}. Suppose that a control law is constructed such that for all x ∈ CA,
u = −x1 − x2. Note that actuation constraints can be ignored in CA if a hard clamping function is





for all states in CA. A valid safe set can be constructed by identifying a region of attraction con-
12
(a) Explicit safe set CS (green) (b) Implicit safe set CS (green) and backup set Cb (blue)
Figure 1.3: Phase plots for system (1.15) with the complement of the constraint space CA shaded
red, and CA\CS shaded purple. The figure on the left corresponds to the sets described in Exam-
ple 1.6.3, and the figure on the right corresponds to the sets described in Example 1.6.5.
tained in CA. For instance, note that
V (x) = 1.2x21 + 0.2x1x2 + 1.1x
2
2 (1.16)
is a Lyapunov function for the closed-loop system and the level curve V (x) = 1 is contained in CA.
Thus, CS = {x ∈ R2 |h(x) ≥ 0}, where h(x) = 1− V (x) defines an invariant set contained in CA.
The sets CS and CA are depicted along with the system flow in Figure 1.3(a). Note that while CS is
invariant, it is not the largest forward invariant set contained in CA. It is said to be conservative. 
Explicit identification of forward invariant subsets is typically obtained only at the expense of
conservatism. In particular, the methods used to identify forward invariant sets are not generally
scalable to complex and high dimensional systems, and the safe sets obtained with these methods
may greatly underapproximate the largest safe set obtainable. However, an explicit (functional)
representation of the safe set boundary is not always necessary. One may implicitly define CS in
terms of the closed-loop trajectories under the control law. For example, consider a backup control
law ub : X → U , and let φub(t;x) represent the state reached after starting at x ∈ X and applying
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ub for t units of time. Then the set
CS = {x ∈ Rn | ∀t ≥ 0, φub(t;x) ∈ CA} (1.17)
is by definition an invariant set under ub, and it is entirely contained in CA. The utility of this
definition arises from the observation that it is possible to check whether individual states are
safe simply by integrating the dynamics forward from those states. For example, if CA := {x ∈
|ϕ(x) ≥ 0} then the following are equivalent:
(i) ∀t ≥ 0, φub(t;x) ∈ CA, (ii) inf
t∈[0,∞)
ϕ(φub(t;x)) ≥ 0 (1.18)
It is interesting to note that in special cases where the infimum can be solved in closed form, the
solution can be used to define an explicit safe set, as shown in the following example.







with u ∈ [−1, 1], the constraint set CA = {x ∈ R2 |x1 ≥ 0}, and the admissible control law




x0,1 − sin(x0,2) + sin(x0,2 + t)
t+ x0,2
 (1.20)
and x0 is safe if
inf
t∈[0,∞)
φub1 (x0, t) = x0,1 − sin(x0,2)− 1 ≥ 0. (1.21)
Using this information, a safe set under this maneuver can be defined explicitly as,
CS = {x ∈ R2 |x1 − sin(x2)− 1 ≥ 0}. (1.22)
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Figure 1.4: Phase plot for system (1.19) under ub = 1. The safe set CS is shaded green, the
complement of CA is shaded red, and CA\CS is shaded purple.
The sets CA, CS are depicted in Figure 1.4 along with the flow of the system under ub = 1. 
Importantly, the system flow φub(t;x) can readily be evaluated over a finite time horizon T =
[0, T ] by numerically integrating the dynamics. In this case, safety of a trajectory can be shown by
ensuring that (i) the trajectory lies in CA over T and (ii) the endpoint of the finite trajectory T lies
in a known invariant subset Cb ⊆ CA. That is,
CS = {x ∈ Rn | ∀t ∈ T , φub(t;x) ∈ CA ∧ φub(T ;x) ∈ Cb}. (1.23)
In this context, a safe terminal set Cb ⊆ CA is referred to as a backup set, and the set described by
(1.23) is the safe backward image (SBI) of Cb. Note that numerical integration over a continuous
interval [0, T ] requires that the trajectory be approximated with a finite amount of points sampled
along this interval; e.g. T = {t1, ..., tK} ⊂ [0, T ]. However it is possible for the constraints
defining CA can be tightened in such a way that accounts for this (see for example [22]). While a
single case is presented here, various forms of implicit safety may arise under modified assump-
tions. For instance, [23] considers the case where Cb is not forward invariant, and guarantees are in
finite time. This concept may be extended to nondeterministic systems by approximating forward
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reachable sets or invariant tubes around the recovery trajectories (see Chapter 4). The topology of
the constraint set and safe set for both implicit and explicit cases is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Example 1.6.5. Consider the system described by (1.15) along with the associated constraint set
CA = {x ∈ R2 |ϕ(x) ≥ 0} with ϕ(x) = 1 − ‖x‖∞. The safe set from the previous example is
now taken as the backup set. That is, consider the backup set Cb = {x ∈ R2 |hb(x) ≥ 0 } with
hb(x) = 1−V (x) and V (x) described by (1.16). The flow for this system can be evaluated exactly
as
φub(t;x) = eAtx, (1.24)
where A is the system matrix from (1.15). The backup time horizon T = [0, 3] is considered, and
a state x ∈ X is in the safe backward image if the following conditions are met,
(i) ∀t ∈ T , ϕ(eAtx) ≥ 0, (ii) hb(eAtKx) ≥ 0. (1.25)
The sets for this case are depicted in Figure 1.3(b). 
Identifying Safe Backup Sets
Backup sets Cb are safe terminal sets that act as seeds of safety. As seen in Figure 1.3 the backup
set may be used to implicitly identify a larger safe region via trajectories under a backup controller.
This is useful because small invariant sets are generally much easier to find than large ones. Fur-
thermore, a finite-time trajectory can be used to show safety over an infinite horizon when it is
shown that it the trajectory safely reaches such a set. This concept has been frequently explored in
the context of trajectory optimization and Model-Predictive Control (MPC) [24, 25]. In the litera-
ture related to MPC, the backup set is often referred to as a terminal feasible invariant set. Backup
sets are safe sets and may be computed as any safe subset of CA using the methods described
above. However, it is common to construct these from domain knowledge of safe configurations
of the particular system.
For an example of a safe backup set, consider that ground vehicles and vertical takeoff and
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landing (VTOL) air vehicles may bring themselves to rest in a safe location. In this case, the role
of ub is to generate a safe stopping maneuver; e.g. [26]. Individual rest states are invariant points
in the state space, and sets of adjacent rest states form invariant surfaces or volumes. In many cases
it is not possible or practical to bring a vehicle to rest, and a backup set may instead be identified
from safe periodic trajectories. For example, fixed wing aircraft may compute safe loiter circles
[27, 28, 29, 25] or spacecraft may compute a set of safe orbits [30]. In many cases, the invariant set
is a region without volume, and only an infinitesimal perturbation is required to cause a departure
from the set. In practice, it is desirable to show that such surfaces are locally attractive under some
backup control law, or to explicitly identify a larger invariant region around the initial set.
Example 1.6.6. Consider the damped linear system,
ẍ = −ẋ+ u (1.26)
with the constraint set given by CA = {x ∈ R |x ≥ 0}. A safe backup set is given by the subset of
CA with zero velocity: Cb = {x ∈ R |x ≥ 0, ẋ = 0}. Note that Cb ⊂ CA and that Cb is invariant
when u = 0. 
Example 1.6.7. Consider two spacecraft in planar orbit around a central body: (i) a target space-
craft, which is in a fixed circular orbit with period τ , and (ii) a chaser spacecraft of mass m. In this
setting, the dynamics of the chaser spacecraft are given by the Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill equations,








ẋ4 = −2nx3 + 1mu2
ẋ5 = −|u1| − |u2|
(1.27)
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with state x ∈ R5, and control input u ∈ [−umax, umax]2. In this setting, x1, x2 denote the relative
distances between the spacecraft, x3, x4 denote the relative velocities, and x5 denotes a fuel state.
Additionally, n = 2π
τ
[31]. The constraint set is defined by the constraints that the chaser must
not run out of fuel, and must stay at a distance greater than Rmin from the target spacecraft. The
constraint set is CA = {x ∈ R5 |x21 + x22 −R2min ≥ 0, x5 ≥ 0}.
Backup Set from Invariant Points: Invariant points exist as zero velocity states in the x2-x5-
plane, hence {x ∈ R5 |x1 = x3 = x4 = 0} is invariant for u ≡ 0. A backup set is obtained from
this set as Cb,1 = {x ∈ R5 |x1, x2, x3 = 0, x5 ≥ 0, |x2| ≥ Rmin}.
Backup Set from Periodic Trajectories: It can be shown that the chaser spacecraft is on an
elliptical orbit around the target spacecraft whenever u = 0 and x3 = n2x2, x4 = −2nx1, with




2 where b ≥ 0 is the semi-minor
axis of the orbit. Hence, the linear subspace {x ∈ R5 |x3 = n2x2, x4 = −2nx1} is an invariant
manifold composed of all such closed orbits. A backup set can be constructed from this subspace
by considering range of orbits that fall into the constraint set: Cb,2 = {x ∈ R5 |x3 = n2x2, x4 =
−2nx1, x21 + 14x
2




RTA Systems are online verification mechanisms that filter an unverified primary controller out-
put to ensure system safety. The primary control may come from a human operator, an advanced
control approach, or an autonomous control approach that cannot be verified to the same level
as simpler control designs. The critical feature of RTA systems is their ability to alter unsafe
control inputs explicitly to assure safety. An important quality of an RTA system is that the as-
surance mechanism is constructed in a way that is entirely agnostic to the underlying structure
of the primary controller. By effectively decoupling the enforcement of safety constraints from
performance-related objectives, RTA offers a number of useful advantages over traditional (of-
fline) verification.
A significant benefit of RTA is that it eliminates the need to design the primary controller
in a way that conforms to traditional safety standards, which may not be directly applicable to
the primary control design. Practical consequences of this are that RTA provides a means of
testing new control algorithms on hardware platforms without compromising safety, and that it
provides a potential near-term certification path for autonomous controllers and safety-critical
human-controlled systems. Additionally, the verification of an assurance mechanism is generally
simpler than verification of a performance-based controller, as it does not require consideration of
the potentially complex performance-related objectives. For example, safety verification does not
become more difficult as the primary controller grows more complex, and the verification process
does not need to be repeated when changes are made to the primary controller.
The rise in popularity of RTA can be attributed to many factors, including: (i) the emergence
of mobile autonomous systems operating in safety critical environments, e.g. away from very spe-
cialized and removed applications to the vicinity of humans; (ii) the increasing complexity of the
primary control system in these systems making traditional verification techniques prohibitively
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difficult; (iii) the growing desire to quickly update complex system software without compromis-
ing safety or repeating a costly verification process; (iv) the ability to perform fast computation
online, e.g., integrating trajectories or computing reachable sets; (v) the emergence of control
barrier function (CBF) and active set invariance filtering (ASIF) methods that give smooth and
minimally invasive modifications to the desired actions. Additionally, RTA seems to provide an
attractive solution to bounding the behavior of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI)
systems. For example, while some notable efforts have been made in the direction of generating
and verifying provably safe deep neural network controllers [32, 33, 34, 35], the complexity and
dynamic nature of these systems often precludes the ability to generate rigorous safety guarantees
on the primary controller. The RTA paradigm enables one to forgo this route entirely, without a
need to compromise on safety.
2.1 Run Time Assurance for Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems
Cyber-physical systems are said to be safety-critical when failure would result in loss of life,
damage to property, or other unacceptable damages such as environmental harm [36]. An RTA
architecture acts as an online-verification and enforcement tool for cyber-physical systems, and
guarantees certain system-level safety requirements are met at run time.
2.1.1 The Run Time Assurance Architecture
RTA presents an approach to control design that allows a designer to sidestep the common trade-off
between performance and safety. The central idea behind RTA is to decouple the task of enforcing
safety constraints from all other objectives of the controller. This is achieved by splitting the control
system into two components: a performance-driven primary controller, and a safety-driven RTA
mechanism. The RTA mechanism preempts the desired inputs from the primary controller when
necessary for ensuring the safety of the system, and otherwise lets the input pass through unaltered.
This approach is associated with the feedback control architecture shown in Figure 2.1(b). The















Figure 2.1: (a) Prototypical feedback control system architecture (b) Run time assurance architec-
ture.
variable udes, and the output of the RTA mechanism is referred to as the actual input (or assured
input) and is assigned the variable uact. Fundamentally, an RTA mechanism is a mapping from a
state x ∈ Rn and a desired input udes ∈ U to an actual input uact ∈ U , and has the objectives
of (i) enforcing safety of the system as defined by state constraints, and (ii) having uact as close
as possible to udes, so long as it does not conflict with the first objective. A common choice for
measuring how close the two signals are is the norm of the difference between the two variables.
However, this measurement may also take other forms, such as the integral of the deviation. An
RTA mechanism is said to be assured when the output uact renders a particular set of states safe.
Moreover, an assured RTA mechanism guarantees safety for the entire system, and for all time,
and this is true regardless of the chosen primary controller.
2.2 Properties of Run Time Assurance Systems
2.2.1 Implicit and Explicit RTA Approaches
An RTA mechanism is a control law that renders a subset of the constraint space forward invariant,
that activates a recovery response near the boundary of that set, and that passes through the desired
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input from the primary controller everywhere else. The set made safe under the RTA is referred to
as the safe operational region of the RTA system and it is denoted by CS. More precisely:
Definition 2.2.1. (safe operational region) Given a dynamical system, a constraint set CA, and an
RTA control law uact : X × U → U , the safe operational region of the RTA system refers to the
largest subset of CA that is forward invariant under uact. 4
A canonical approach to constructing an RTA mechanism is to find a safe backup control law,
and to require that this control law be active near the boundary of the set that is forward invariant
under this control law. In this case, the safe operational region is a forward invariant set under ub.
Approaches of this type are considered in Section 2.3. Alternatively, in cases where the recovery
response is determined as the solution to an optimization program, and safety is enforced with
the constraints of that program, then the safe operational region is a control invariant subset of CA.
This is due to the fact that the optimization program searches over all feasible control actions —i.e.
control invariant sets are forward invariant under certain optimization procedures. Approaches of
this nature are considered in Section 2.4.
As with the safe sets discussed previously, the safe operational region can be identified ex-
plicitly or implicitly. Implicit (or trajectory-based) approaches compute finite-time trajectories
{φub(t;x) ∈ X | t ≤ T } under a backup controller online (at run time) and use the information
in the decision of when or how to intervene. Explicit (or region-based) approaches may or may
not utilize a backup controller, but do not rely on simulating trajectories of the backup controller
online. Typically, explicit approaches identify trusted regions offline via the construction of either
a large forward invariant or control invariant set. That is, implicit RTA approaches are those that
utilize an online look-ahead and will bound the system to an implicitly defined safe set such as the
one given in (1.23) while explicit RTA approaches determine safe states a priori and will bound
the system to an explicitly defined safe set such as the set described by (1.14). This concept is
demonstrated in the following example.
Example 2.2.1. Consider the system described by (1.15) with the constraint space CA := {x ∈
R2 | 1−‖x‖∞ ≥ 0}. An RTA mechanism can be constructed by requiring that the backup controller
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where udes is the desired control input and the predicate ϑ : X → {true, false} represents the ac-
tivation condition (or switching condition). Considered below are implicit and explicit conditions.
Explicit Condition
Let CS = {x ∈ X | h(x) ≥ 0} with h(x) = 1− V (x) and V (x) being the Lyapunov function
(1.16). The following activation condition ensures safety of CS with respect to uact by activating
ub near the boundary,
ϑ(x) : h(x) ≥ ε (2.2)
where ε > 0 defines the size of the RTA activation region. Since, V (x) defines a Lyapunov function
for the closed-loop dynamics under ub, it is known that h(x) is increasing whenever ub is applied.
Furthermore, since ub is activated before the boundary, (2.1) enforces positivity of h(x), meaning
that the system will be forward invariant in CS ⊂ CA.
Implicit Condition
Let Cb = {x ∈ X | h(x) ≥ 0} with h(x) = 1 − V (x) and V (x) being the Lyapunov function
(1.16), then a activation condition for invariance in the safe backward image of Cb is
ϑ(x) : [∀t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ(eAtx) ≥ ε1] ∧ [hb(eAtKx) ≥ ε2] (2.3)
where ε1, ε2 > 0. The safe backward image in this case defines the safe operational region for the
RTA. It is depicted as the green region in Figure 1.3(b). 
There are important tradeoffs associated with implicit and explicit approaches. While iden-
tifying invariant sets explicitly offline generally reduces the online computational burden of the
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algorithm, the task may become intractable for complex and high dimensional systems. In such
cases, implicit (trajectory-based) approaches become favorable. The key advantage to assessing
safety through trajectories online is that, in the simplest case, it only requires a finite-time simu-
lation of the recovery maneuver, which is generally a tractable task. A secondary benefit is that
it handles dynamic environments and changes in the model better; i.e. rather than needing to re-
compute an invariant subset of CA, one only needs to update the simulation parameters. However,
an important practical consideration is that implicit approaches rely on the ability to accurately
forecast recovery trajectories, and the predicted behavior may be increasingly sensitive to noise
(i.e. less accurate) as the length of the backup trajectory is increased. One way to address this is to
simulate the reachable set around a recovery trajectory. See Chapter 4 for an example approach.
It is interesting to note that since a backup set Cb is an explicitly defined invariant subset of
the constraint set CA, an implicit approach to safety will typically involve a combination of (i)
explicitly identifying an invariant set Cb offline (ii) finding a safe trajectory to this set online. In
this sense, the explicit approach can be viewed as a special case of the implicit approach where
the backup trajectory consists of only a single point. Furthermore, any explicitly defined safe set
can be used as part of an implicit approach. The implicit approach allows for the problem to be
solved in a way that takes advantage of both offline and online resources. Specifically, finding a
larger backup set offline reduces the online computational burden by reducing the length of the
trajectory required to obtain the same operational region; likewise, integrating backup trajectories
over a longer horizon reduces the need to identify large safe sets offline. Generally, for simple
systems, the problem of identifying invariant sets can be solved offline. As systems become more
complex, one must rely more and more on online simulations.
2.2.2 Zero and First Order Methods
Filtering approaches in RTA may be classified into zero-order and first-order methods. Zero-order
algorithms are derivative free. They are typically, though not necessarily, associated with the
Simplex architecture and choosing from a discrete set of possible control signals. For example,
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the RTA mechanism may choose between applying the desired signal or backup signal at any
time. In this case, one may observe the effects of chatter; i.e. variations in the output of the RTA
mechanism are not smooth with respect to variations in the initial state or desired input. This may
have practical implications. For instance, the action may cause excessive wear to the actuators,
on-board components may experience interruption to their operations, or passengers may observe
the intervention as being more abrupt, resulting in a less pleasant experience (e.g. consider an
automobile that only intervenes through applying the brakes at maximum capacity). These effects
may be handled with various heuristics; e.g. hysteresis, or interpolating between ub and udes as the
state approaches the boundary of the safe operational region. Alternatively, one may turn to a first
order method.
First order methods require derivatives, and are typically associated with methods described
Section 2.4. In this case, first-order information is used in a barrier condition, which constrains
the set of available inputs to a subset of admissible and safe inputs. An optimization framework
may be used to choose the input within this set according to some cost function. A common cost
specification requires that the RTA choose the control that is closest (in a 2-norm sense) to the
desired control. RTA filters constructed in this way will have smooth variations in the output.
While this eliminates the effect of chatter, it introduces added complexity into the problem and
generally requires greater computational resources.
Table 2.1: Classification of RTA applications in the literature.
Implicit Explicit
spacecraft collision avoidance [37] waypoint tracking cyber-physical system [38]
fixed-wing aircraft ground avoidance (Auto-GCAS) [39, 40] advanced flight control systems [41]
Simplex fixed-wing aircraft obstacle avoidance [25, 28, 42] lane keeping [43]
safety against LTL specifications [44, 45] aircraft conflict resolution [46, 47, 48]
collision avoidance for high speed quadrotor navigation [49, 26] decentralized collision avoidance for quadrotors [50, 51]
collision avoidance during lane-changing maneuvers [52] ground robot navigation around obstacles [53, 54]
bipedal walking/ exoskeletons [55] bipedal walking/ exoskeletons [56, 57]
robotic manipulator arms [58] lane keeping [59, 60]
ASIF mobile inverted pendulum (Segway) [23] mobile inverted pendulum (Segway) [61]
rapid aerial exploration of unknown environments [62] robotic grasping [63]
multi-robot systems [64] swarm robotics (Robotarium) [65, 66, 67, 68]
fixed-wing aircraft collision avoidance [69] motorized rehabilitative cycling system [70]
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2.3 The Simplex Architecture
The Simplex architecture [71, 72, 38, 73, 44] relates to an RTA design where safety is guaranteed
by using decision logic to activate a backup controller. That is, a Simplex RTA will at any time,
apply either the desired input udes or the input from a backup controller ub. Without loss in gen-
erality, multiple backup controllers may be considered. One way to describe Simplex RTAs is as
a hybrid dynamical system, such as (2.1). Though it is common in practice to verify the backup
controller, this is not required in order to verify the RTA system as a whole. A depiction of the













Figure 2.2: Simplex architecture with a physical plant, a backup controller, decision logic, and a
primary controller.
2.3.1 Latched and Unlatched Implementations
Simplex RTA may be latched or unlatched. In an unlatched implementation, the decision logic
releases control of the recovery system as soon as the activation condition becomes inactive. For
example, (2.1) describes an unlatched RTA implementation that switches from the primary control
law udes to the backup control law ub whenever a condition ϑ is active. Alternatively, a latched
implementation will hold its activation state until a separate release condition is met. The release
condition may for example consist of following the backup trajectory for some fixed amount of
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time, bringing the system to a particular configuration, or having a human operator return control
after assessing the problem. Other implementations of latched RTAs may require a system reset
before switching back, such as a computer reset supervised by a human operator.
2.3.2 Provably Safe RTA with Black Box Backup Controllers
Implicit RTA systems rely on forecasting recovery trajectories under a backup controller in order
to assess safety. It is important to note that the backup controller does not need to be verified in
order to guarantee safety of the RTA system. This concept can be made apparent when one notes
that the system can regulate to previously computed safe trajectories in the event that the backup
controller fails to generate a safe solution. Under this paradigm, the task of the backup controller is
to propose safe trajectories which the monitor then verifies online. A practical consequence of this
is that high-performing black-box controllers can safely be used to generate backup trajectories.
This concept is well known in practice [27] and is thoroughly explored in the context of Simplex-
based systems in [74]. Furthermore, the idea extends to other methods of RTA. For example, in
Section 2.4.2, an ASIF is constructed which utilizes a backup controller taking the form of a neural
network approximation of an optimal control policy.
2.3.3 Canonical Algorithms
Included in this section are a set of canonical algorithms for Simplex-based RTA. In this case, we
consider the deterministic discrete time system,
x(i+ 1) = F (x(i), u(i)) (2.4)
where x ∈ X ⊆ Rn denotes the state, u ∈ U ⊂ Rm denotes the control input and i ∈ Z denotes
the time index. A constraint set is defined as CA ⊆ X . It is assumed that a backup control law
ub : Rn → U is defined and we let φub(i;x) be the state of (2.4) reached at i ≥ 0 when beginning
at state x at i = 1 and evolving under ub.
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The idea behind the algorithms in this section is to assess the safety of a probe step. That is,
at any state xcurr ∈ X , whether to accept or reject the desired control input udes ∈ U is based
on whether the candidate next state reached under this input xcand := F (xcurr, udes) is safe. In
the first case, an explicit safe set is assumed to be defined. The second case considers an implicit
approach, which relies on online simulations under the backup dynamics. A deterministic discrete
time system is assumed for clarity of the algorithms and their associated guarantees. However,
the algorithms may be adapted to continuous time systems, to multiple backup controllers, latched
implementations, etc.
Explicit Simplex Filter
Algorithm 1 describes an explicit Simplex-based RTA algorithm, the Region-Based Simplex Filter
(RBSF). In addition to a backup control law ub, it is assumed that a safe set CS ⊆ CA is defined
such that CS is invariant under ub. The algorithm renders the RTA system forward invariant in CS.
This is apparent through the observations that (i) by nature of the invariance property, applying ub
anywhere in CS will lead to a next state that is still in the set (ii) the sample step allows for inputs
that would cause a departure from CS to be detected and replaced with ub. In practice, one may
choose to add conservatism to the approach by working with any underappoximation C̃S ⊆ CS. The
region CS \ C̃S is often referred to as a buffer. A practical consideration is that the backup controller
should locally attract solutions outside of C̃S to C̃S near the boundary. That is, it is favorable to
ensure that a recovery is possible in the case where the state is perturbed outside of the safe region.
One way to do this is to ensure that all initial conditions in the buffer will lead to C̃S if ub is applied;
e.g. this is the case when CS and C̃S are both sublevel sets of a Lyapunov function.
Example 2.3.1. Consider the double integrator system described by (1.11) discretized over a pe-
riod of 0.1 s, and consider the constraint set (1.12). The backup control law udes = −1 renders
the set CS = {x ∈ R2 | − 2x1 − x22 ≥ 0} forward invariant and it is clear that CS ⊆ CA. Figure
2.7(a) shows a simulation of the RBSF algorithm with these parameters under the desired control
udes = 1. 
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Algorithm 1: Region-Based Simplex Filter (Explicit Simplex)
input : Current State xcurr ∈ X
: Desired Input udes ∈ U
output : Safe Control Input uact ∈ U
predefined: Constraint set CA ⊂ X
: Invariant Set CS ⊂ CA
: Backup Control Law ub : Rn → U .
1: function uact = RBSF(xcurr, udes)
2: xcand ← F (xcurr, udes)





Algorithm 2 describes an implicit Simplex-based algorithm, the Simulation-Based Simplex Filter
(SBSF). It is assumed that a backup set Cb ⊆ CA is defined, and required that Cb is invariant
under a backup control law ub : X → U . The controller ub may come from a closed-form
control expression, a black box function, an MPC, a motion primitive, etc. In contrast to the RBSF
algorithm, which constrains the system to evolve in an explicitly defined invariant region, SBSF
uses the smaller invariant set Cb as a means to access a larger implicitly defined invariant set.
Specifically, SBSF constrains the system to the safe backward image of Cb:
CS = {x ∈ X |φub(i;x) ∈ CA ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, φub(N ;x) ∈ Cb}, (2.5)
where, φub(i;x) is the ith point in an N point trajectory obtained from simulating the dynamics
(2.4) under a backup controller ub from an initial state x. Since CS is forward invariant under
ub, the algorithm renders the RTA system forward invariant in CS. As in the case of the RBSF
algorithm, this becomes apparent from the observations that (i) applying ub anywhere in CS will
lead to a state that is also in CS and (ii) the sample step under udes can reliably be used to detect
inputs that would cause a departure from CS. Conservatism can be added to this approach by using
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Algorithm 2: Simulation-Based Simplex Filter (Implicit Simplex)
input : Current State xcurr ∈ X
: Desired Input udes ∈ U
output : Safe Control Input uact ∈ U
predefined: Constraint Set CA ⊂ X
: Invariant Backup Set Cb ⊂ CA
: Backup Control Law ub : Rn → U .
1: function uact =SBSF(xcurr, udes)
2: xcand ← F (xcurr, udes)
3: compute: φub(i;xcand) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}




under-approximations of CA and Cb. Note that the above algorithm assumes a deterministic system
and relies on simulating single trajectories under the backup dynamics. This can be extended to
the nondeterministic case by simulating an overapproximation of the forward reachable set under
the backup dynamics, and requiring that Cb is robustly forward invariant. A nondeterministic
formulation is considered in Chapter 4.
Example 2.3.2. Consider the double integrator system described by (1.11) discretized over a pe-
riod of 0.1 s, and consider the constraint set (1.12). The backup control law udes = −1 renders the
set Cb = {x ∈ R2 | − x1 ≥ 0, −x2 ≥ 0} forward invariant and it is clear that Cb ⊆ CA. Figure
2.7(b) shows a simulation of the SBSF algorithm with these parameters under the desired control
udes = 1. 
2.4 Active Set Invariance Filtering
Active set invariance filtering (ASIF) methods are associated with a class of first-order, optimization-
based RTA algorithms. As with many Simplex-based techniques, they are system agnostic, prov-
ably correct, and exhibit a number of robustness properties which make them attractive in practice.
In addition, ASIFs are minimally invasive with respect to the safety constraints. This results in
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a smoother and more gradual intervention than with approaches that rely on switching to backup
controllers directly.
This section considers systems of the form
ẋ = f(x) + g(x)u. (2.6)
When (1.4) is of the form (2.6), the dynamics are said to be control affine, and it is assumed
throughout the following that f(x) : Rn → Rn and g(x) : Rn → Rn×m are locally Lipshitz
continuous in their inputs so that, in particular, solutions to (2.6) are unique when they exist.
ASIFs are constructed as quadratic programs. A common choice for the objective function is the l2
norm of the difference between the desired input udes and actual input uact. The constraints of the
program, which are known as barrier constraints, take the form BCi(x, u) = ai(x)u+ bi(x) ≥ 0,
i ∈ {1, ..., N}. The canonical ASIF controller is given below as:
ASIF-QP
uact(x, udes) = argminu∈U‖u− udes‖22 (2.7)
s.t. BCi(x, u) = ai(x)u+ bi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., N (2.8)
The ASIF-QP guarantees system safety with respect to an operational region CS when the
following two properties are satisfied by the barrier constraints:
• ϑBC1 : if (2.8) is satisfied then the system is forward invariant in some set CS ⊆ CA. i.e.
BCi(x, u) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} =⇒ CS forward invariant (2.9)
where CS ⊆ CA.
31
• ϑBC2 : it is possible to satisfy (2.8) from any state in the set CS. i.e. ∀x ∈ CS, and ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , N},
sup
u∈U
[BCi(x, u)] ≥ 0 (2.10)
The first property ensures that the RTA mechanism will bound trajectories to the set CS, as long
as there exists a feasible input satisfying the barrier constraint. The second property ensures that
for all states in CS, it is possible to find a feasible input that satisfies the barrier constraint. Since
quadratic programs can be solved in such a way that feasible solutions are found whenever they
exist, guaranteeing the existence of a solution is sufficient for ensuring feasibility of the ASIF-QP.
When both properties are satisfied, CS defines a safe set with respect to the ASIF. Moreover, the
ASIF-QP is minimally invasive in the sense that the l2 distance between uact and udes is minimized,
subject to the barrier constraints.
As with the case of Simplex, implicit and explicit approaches emerge for ASIF based on how
the safe operational region CS is identified. First, explicit ASIFs are studied. In this case, CS
obtained by identifying a control invariant set explicitly as the super zero level-set of a smooth
function. Next, in the case of implicit ASIFs, a control invariant set is identified implicitly through
the trajectories of a backup control law. A more thorough review of explicit ASIF approaches is
provided in [75] and implicit ASIF approaches in [76]. See also [77] for a review of both implicit
and explicit ASIF approaches.
2.4.1 Barrier Constraints from an Explicitly Defined Safe Set
Consider a set CS that is defined as the super zero-level set of a continuously differentiable function
h : Rn → R, i.e.
CS = {x ∈ X |h(x) ≥ 0} (2.11)
∂CS = {x ∈ CS |h(x) = 0}, (2.12)
32
and suppose that 0 is a regular value of h; i.e. the gradient of h does not vanish on the boundary.
The goal is to design a barrier constraint BC(x, u) that satisfies ϑBC1 and ϑ
BC
2 , and consequently
makes the set CS forward invariant under the ASIF-QP. One method for ensuring the forward
invariance of CS involves checking a subtangentality condition over the boundary of CS. Sometimes
called Nagumo’s condition, this result is as follows: if
Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u(x) ≥ 0 (2.13)
holds for all x ∈ ∂CS, then CS is forward invariant for the closed-loop dynamics of (2.6) under
u(x), where Lf , Lg in (2.13) denote Lie derivatives of h along f and g, respectively. Informally,
(2.13) ensures that ḣ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ ∂CS and, thus, any smooth control law u(x) satisfying
(2.13) ensures the forward invariance of CS when applied to (2.6).
ሶ𝒙 = 𝑓 𝒙 + 𝑔 𝒙 𝑢∇ℎ 𝒙
ℎ 𝒙 = 0
ℎ 𝒙 > 0
ℎ 𝒙 < 0
ሶℎ 𝒙 = ∇ℎ𝑇 𝒙 ሶ𝒙
Figure 2.3: Barrier geometry for constraint function h : R2 → R.
The constraint (2.13) is not practical for use directly in an optimization framework as it is
activated exactly on the boundary of CS, which is a region without volume. The solution presented
in [78] is to use similar condition that is active everywhere in CS, and that includes a strengthening
term which relaxes the constraint away from the boundary: for all x ∈ CS
Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u(x) + α(h(x)) ≥ 0 (2.14)
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where α : R→ R is an extended class κ∞ function. A continuous function α : R→ R is class κ∞
if α is strictly increasing and α(0) = 0. Since α(h(x)) = 0 on the boundary, satisfaction of (2.14)
implies satisfaction of (2.13). Hence, (2.14) implies CS is forward invariant for the closed-loop
dynamics of (2.6) under u(x). For this reason, an attractive method for constructing the ASIFs
(2.7)–(2.8) is to form barrier constraints using
BC(x, u) = Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u+ α(h(x)). (2.15)
Applying the previous theoretical results, the resulting ASIF ensures the forward invariance of CS
and therefore satisfies ϑBC1 , as discussed above.
In order to satisfy the requirement ϑBC2 , the functions h, α must be chosen in such a way that
ensures that there always exists u ∈ U satisfying the barrier constraint; equivalently,
sup
u∈U
[Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u] ≥ −α(h(x)) (2.16)
must hold for all x ∈ CS. Though it is on occasion possible to obtain h, α analytically, satisfying
this requirement is in general accomplished through the computation of a control invariant subset
of CA. Specifically, if CS is a control invariant set, then it is always possible to find a strength-
ening function α(x) such that ϑBC2 is satisfied [61]. Alternatively, one may bypass choosing α
altogether with a relaxed QP formulation (see [61], [77] for more details). Identifying a control
invariant subset CS ⊆ CA is the main challenge in implementing this method. Since CS defines
the safe operational region for the RTA, it is desirable for this region to be as large as possible,
with the largest possible control invariant subset being known as the viability kernel. Approximat-
ing viability kernels has been the subject of a wide variety of research. Approaches that have been
proposed include: discretized solutions the Hamilton-Jacobi equations [79], sum-of-squares (SOS)
optimization [59], and sampling [80]. See [77, 81] for a more extensive overview of techniques.
Example 2.4.1. Consider the double integrator system described by (1.11) and the constraint set
(1.12). A control invariant set is given by the super zero level-set of h(x) = −2x1 − x22 and
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given a class κ∞ function α, the barrier constraint is −2x2(1 + u) + α(−2x1 − x22) ≥ 0. Note
that ∀x ∈ CS, α(h(x)) ≥ 0 and supu∈U [Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u] = 0, hence the barrier constraint is
viable. 
Example 2.4.2. Consider the dynamics of a spacecraft in unconstrained rotation,
ẋ = J−1(−x× Jx) + J−1u (2.17)
where x ∈ R3 represents the angular velocity, J = diag(J1, J2, J3) ∈ R3×3 is a diagonal inertia
matrix and u ∈ [−1, 1]3. A control invariant set for this system is given by CS = {x ∈ R3 |h(x) ≥
0} with,
h(x) = K − xTJx (2.18)
for any K ∈ R+. The fact that this set is control invariant is made apparent with the observation
that the rotational kinetic energy xTJx is constant when u = 0. Choosing α(x) = x, the barrier
constraint is∇hT (x)ẋ+ h(x) ≥ 0, which simplifies to,
K − xTJx− 2xTu ≥ 0 (2.19)
It is easy to show that this constraint is viable everywhere within CS. Namely, K − xTJx ≥ 0
everywhere in CS, and one can always find u ∈ U such that −2xTu ≥ 0.

If there exists an extended class κ∞ function satisfying (2.16) for all x ∈ X then h(x) is said
to be a control barrier function [75, 82, 83]. Barrier functions are were first developed in the
context of nonlinear and hybrid system verification [84, 85]. The idea was first extended to the
RTA problem with quadratic programs in [86], and it was developed more in [82]. In recent years,
there has been a surge in interest in this topic. The theory has been extended to relax assumptions
on smoothness [87], to discrete time [88] and stochastic [89] systems, and to enforce temporal
logic specifications [90]. Likewise, the practicality of the approach is demonstrated in a variety of
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Algorithm 3: Explicit Active Set Invariance Filter (EASIF)
input : Current State xcurr ∈ X
: Desired Input udes ∈ U
output : Safe Control Input uact ∈ U
predefined: Constraint Set CA ⊂ X
: Control Invariant Set CS ⊂ CA
1: function uact =EASIF(xcurr, udes)
2: solve: (2.7) subject to the constraint (2.15).
3: return uact(xcurr, udes).
real-world applications, as shown in Table 2.1. It is important to note that in order for (2.15) to
depend on the control input u, the constraint function h(x) must have a relative degree of one; i.e.
Lgh(x) 6= 0. Safety constraint functions with higher relative degrees are addressed in the literature
on exponential control barrier functions [91, 75].
Example 2.4.3. Consider the system ẍ = u with u ∈ U = (−∞,∞) and the constraint function
h(x) = −x1. Note that while actuation is unlimited in this case, it is not possible to enforce the
barrier constraint Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)u ≥ α(h(x)) as Lgh(x) = 0. 
Case Study: The Robotarium, An RTA Enabled Remote-Access Swarm Robotics Testbed
The Robotarium [65, 66, 67, 68] is a remotely accessible swarm robotics testbed with the stated
mission to democratize robotics by providing remote access to a state-of-the-art multi-robot re-
search facility. The lab consists of a 12ft×14ft custom arena and a number of differential drive
robots, known as GritsBots. The testbed exhibits features such as Vicon-based real time motion-
capture, wireless inductive charging, video capture of experiments, and an above mounted pro-
jector that allows users to project time-varying environmental projections onto the testbed during
experiments. Users may submit code to control the robots through MATLAB or Python scripts,
that are submited through the Robotarium website.
The open-access nature of the lab presents unique challenges in terms of safety. Experiments
must remain as faithful as possible to the user specified behavior while being provably safe, so
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as to prevent damage to the lab equipment. Offline verification of the user code would be a pro-
hibitively difficult and time consuming task for the operators of the lab, and would place an un-
necessary burden of correctness on its users. Consequently, an RTA solution to safety is utilized,
and user submitted algorithms are treated as black box functions that can be probed at run time.
Specifically, control barrier function based quadratic programs (explicit ASIF) are used to prevent
collisions between the various robots involved in an experiment. An explicit ASIF-based approach
is attractive in this case as it is minimally invasive to the desired inputs and provides a smooth
overriding behavior. Since the planning is conducted under a single-integrator dynamics model,
explicit identification of viable sets is fully-tractable problem offline.
2.4.2 Barrier Constraints from an Implicitly Defined Safe Set
As discussed in the previous section, the barrier constraint is viable when it restricts the system to
a control invariant set. If an explicit representation of a large control invariant subset of CA can
be obtained, then with the appropriate choice of α, a valid barrier constraint is obtained through
(2.15). The key idea behind the implicit approach to ASIF [61, 23, 76] is to filter with respect to an
implicitly defined control invariant set. Specifically, given a backup control law ub and a backup
set Cb that is invariant under ub, one can develop barrier constraints that activate near the boundary
of the safe backward image of Cb. The idea was first proposed in [61] and further developed in [23,
76]. A tutorial on the topic is provided in [69], and some notable applications are listed in Table
2.1. A key advantage to this approach is that it does not require the computation of a large control
invariant set.
Consider a smooth backup control law ub : X → U and suppose that the constraint set is given
by
CA := {x ∈ X |ϕ(x) ≥ 0}, (2.20)
and a backup set Cb ⊆ CA is given by
Cb = {x ∈ X |hb(x) ≥ 0}. (2.21)
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Now considering an integration horizon of [0, Tb], the safe backward image of Cb is
CS = {x ∈ Rn | ∀t ∈ [0, Tb], ϕ(φub(t;x)) ≥ 0 ∧ hb(φub(Tb;x)) ≥ 0}. (2.22)
where φub(t;x) is the flow of (2.6) under ub, evaluated t seconds from x. Given an extended class




+ α(ϕ(φ(tb;x))) ≥ 0 (2.23)
dhb(φ(Tb;x))
dt
+ α(hb(φ(Tb;x)) ≥ 0 (2.24)
for all tb ∈ [0, Tb]. The constraint (2.23) enforces that the points along the backup trajectory stay
in the constraint space CA, and (2.24) enforces that the endpoint of the backup trajectory stay in
Cb. Expanding the derivative terms [22] yields the implicit ASIF barrier constraints:
∇ϕ(φub(tb;x))Dφub(tb;x)[f(x) + g(x)u] + α(ϕ(φub(tb;x))) ≥ 0 (2.25)
∇hb(φub(Tb;x))Dφub(Tb;x)[f(x) + g(x)u] + α(hb(φub(Tb;x))) ≥ 0. (2.26)
for all tb ∈ [0, Tb]. Note that since tb lives in the interval [0, Tb], (2.25) represents an uncount-
able number of constraints. In practice one may approximate the constrained set of states by
numerically integrating (2.6) forward under ub and evaluating φub(t;x) at discrete times tb ∈
{0, t1, ..., tN−1, Tb}. It is shown in [22] how the finite set of intermediate constraints may be tight-
ened in such a way that is sufficient for satisfying the constraints with an infinite number of tra-
jectory points. One may compute Dφub(tb;x) by integrating along with (2.6) a sensitivity matrix
Q(tb, x) = Dφ







Algorithm 4: Implicit Active Set Invariance Filter (IASIF)
input : Current State xcurr ∈ X
: Desired Input udes ∈ U
output : Safe Control Input uact ∈ U
predefined: Constraint Set CA ⊂ X
: Invariant Backup Set Cb ⊆ CA
: Smooth Backup Control Law ub : X → U .
1: function uact =IASIF(xcurr, udes)
2: Compute: φub(tb;xcurr) ∀tb ∈ {0, t1, ..., tN−1, Tb} by integrating (2.6) under ub
3: Evaluate: Dfcl(φub(tb;xcurr)) ∀tb ∈ {0, t1, ..., tN−1, Tb}
4: Compute: Dφub(tb, xcurr) ∀tb ∈ {0, t1, ..., tN−1, Tb} by integrating (2.27)
5: Solve: (2.7) subject to the constraints (2.25)-(2.26)
6: return uact(xcurr, udes).
with Q(0, x) = In×n and where Dfcl(φub(tb;x)) is the Jacobian of the closed-loop dynamics of
(2.6) under the control law ub(x), evaluated at φub(tb;x). In order for this term to be defined, it
is necessary that the control law ub be smooth. As such, it is often necessary to consider smooth
saturation functions for bounding the control law to the admissible domain U .
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where x1, x3 denote positions and x2, x3 denote velocities for the vehicles, b1 = 0.1 and b2 =
0.25. The safety constraint is collision avoidance ϕ(x) = x3 − x1 and the constraint set is
CA = {x ∈ R4 |ϕ(x) ≥ 0}. To simplify the analysis, finite-time safety is considered, with
the endpoint constraint (2.26) being omitted. The backup controller ub = [−1, 1]T is integrated
over a 10 s horizon and α(x) = 2x. Figure 2.4 shows the result of a simulation with udes(t) =
[1− exp(−0.1 t), exp(−0.25 t)− 1]T . 
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Figure 2.4: Simulation of the implicit ASIF algorithm for cooperative collision avoidance of two
vehicles.
Example 2.4.5. Consider the system given by (2.17) and the constraint set CA = {x ∈ R3 |ϕ(x) ≥
0} with,
ϕ(x) = ω2max − x21 − x22 − x33 (2.29)
where ωmax ∈ R>0 represents the maximum allowable angular speed. The backup control law
ub = tanh((x× Jx)− kdJx) (2.30)
with kd > 0 is bounded to [−1, 1] and stabilizes system (2.17) to the origin. Furthermore, it can be
shown that Cb = {x ∈ R3 |K − xTJx ≥ 0} is invariant under ub(x) (see from previous example
that this is invariant under the control law u(x) ≡ 0). The largest ellipsoid of this form that is
contained in CA is obtained by choosing K = ω2max/min(J1, J2, J3).












)]T and with ωmax = 1 m/s, kd = 1, J1 = 12 kg m2,
J2 = 12 kg m
2, J3 = 5 kg m
2 and the backup horizon tb ∈ {0, 0.05, ..., 3}. The trajectory is blue
where udes = uact and red where the RTA mechanism is active. 
Application: Neural Network Approximation of Optimal Backup Controller
Here an application of the implicit ASIF algorithm is considered for a neural network controller.
Consider a planar model of the two wheeled inverted pendulum (commonly referred to as a Seg-
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Figure 2.5: Simulation of implicit ASIF algorithm for spacecraft angular velocity dynamics. The
constraint set CA is represented by the purple sphere, the backup set Cb is represented by the blue
ellipsoid. The surface of this ellipsoid has constant kinetic energy. The bottom left plot projects this
information into normed space, and the top left plot shows the desired and actual control values.
way) shown in Figure 2.6. The state vector is composed of the following variables: position (p),
velocity (ṗ), pitch angle (ψ) and pitch rate (ψ̇), and the input (u) is taken as the voltage applied
to the motors. The equations are derived using classical Lagrangian mechanics assuming no-slip
between the ground and the wheels and using a first-order model of a DC motor. The resulting
formulation is control affine.
A backup controller is derived from solutions to the following optimal control problem, stated
in continuous time:







s.t. ẋ = f(x) + g(x)u












Figure 2.6: Segway vehicle (left); Comparison of the safe backward images (SBIs) of Cb when
using an LQR, solving the optimal control problem (OCP), and using a neural network regression
of the OCP (right). The safety set here refers to the constraint space CA.
where the state and input cost matrices are given valuesQ = 0.02I4,andR = 0.01 respectively,
and the input is bounded to the range U = [−20, 20]. The goal of this controller is to drive the
vehicle to the origin while remaining in the constraint set,
CA = {x ∈ R4 | |p| ≤ 3, |ṗ| ≤ 3, |ψ| ≤ π4 , |ψ̇| ≤ π}. (2.32)
Note that penalizing the final time tf conditions the solution to reach its goal under shorter time
horizon. However, the numerical solution to purely time optimal formulation results in highly non-
smooth output signals that often border constraint boundaries. As such, state and input penalties
are added to the cost in order to make the solutions more amenable to functional approximation.
The OCP (2.31) is solved using GPOPS-II [93] software with the “hp-PattersonRao” mesh
method at a tolerance of 0.01. Initial states for each trajectory are generated randomly within
the bounds of CA. A total of 816 trajectories are considered, comprising approximately 49000
trajectory points. The trajectory and control data are used to train a network N (x) : R4 → R
consisting of a single hidden layer with 100 nodes. Hyperbolic tangent sigmoid (tansig) activation
functions are used in this layer. The training process consists of 280 epochs with the “Levenberg–
Marquardt” training algorithm, resulting in a mean squared error (MSE) of 2.96.
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Sampled initial conditions are taken to characterize a level slice of the SBI for (i) the computed
solution to the OCP, (ii) the neural network approximationN , and (iii) an LQR controller with state
and input cost matrices equal to those defined in (2.31) (see Figure 2.6). In this scenario, the initial
position and angle of the vehicle are fixed at zero x, ψ = 0, and a set of initial velocity perturbations
ẋ0, ψ̇0 are given in the bounds of CA. The backup set is chosen as Cb = {x ∈ R4 |hb(x) ≥ 0} with
hb := 0.1
2 − (p/3)2 − (ṗ/3)2 − (4ψ/π)2 − (ψ̇/π)2, (2.33)
and the controller is integrated over a horizon of T = 5 s.
The SBI for the LQR and neural network controllers are estimated by considering a 250× 250
grid of initial velocity perturbations. The SBI boundaries indicated in Figure 2.6 separate the sets
of sampled initial conditions for which a safe backup policies could always be found (interior)
from the sets of sampled initial conditions where safe backup policies were never found (exterior).
For the LQR controller, 21.0% of the samples in fall into the SBI. The neural network controller
extends this to cover 67.3% of the sample points. The increased performance of the neural network
can be attributed to both its suitability to the nonlinear dynamics, and the explicit consideration of
state constraints in the training process.
One may also compare the performance of the approximated controller to the returned solution
to the OCP directly. Figure 2.6 shows the result of a number of GPOPS-II evaluations correspond-
ing to a set of uniformly distributed initial conditions in this domain. It is apparent that many
feasible points extend beyond the SBI of N , indicating that this region could be extended with
more data and a larger network. Infeasible outputs arise when either the program fails to return a
solution, or experiences numerical issues, resulting in a solution that violates one of the constraints.
Feasible solutions are necessarily safe by definition of (2.31). In contrast to the controllers pre-
viously considered, the numerical solution to the OCP does not appear to have a clear boundary
for its SBI. Solutions may fail in any subset of the domain. The neural network approximation
excludes these failed trials, which effectively regularizes the output of the solver. Hence in addi-
tion to providing a more scalable approach, the learned control strategy is seen to demonstrate a
43
comparative improvement in numerical reliability over its operational domain.
2.4.3 Additional Design Considerations for ASIF
Recall that when the properties ϑBC1 and ϑ
BC
2 are satisfied, a set CS is forward invariant under the
RTA control law uact given by the ASIF-QP. While certain guarantees exist under the assumptions
of the model, and indeed the formulations presented exhibit some robustness properties, it is de-
sirable in practice to consider the behavior of the system in the case where the state departs from
CS. A simple solution is to make CS a locally attractive set by switching to a stabilizing backup
controller whenever x 6∈ CS. Alternatively, for explicit ASIF, if h is a concave function, then the
barrier constraint will cause uact to attract solutions to the interior of CS whenever the ASIF-QP is
feasible. A backup controller should be present for the case where a feasible solution is not found.
While outside of the scope of this work, it is interesting to note that attracting solutions outside
of CS to CS doesn’t necessarily produce to the best response of the physical system. For instance
Chapter 5 presents a method for minimizing a function of damage in the presence of an inevitable
collision (see also [94]).
2.5 Discussion and Comparison of Approaches on Double Integrator System
Figure 2.7 shows a comparison of the four algorithms presented in this chapter on the double
integrator system given by (1.11) with u ∈ [−1, 1], CA = {x ∈ R2 | − x1 ≥ 0}, and a controller
update period of 10 Hz. The simulations begin at state x(0) = [−1.75, 0]T and have desired input
udes = 1. Here it can be seen that both Simplex-based algorithms exhibit near identical behavior,
and likewise both ASIF algorithms exhibit similar behavior. In spite of the implicit methods not
having explicit knowledge of the boundary, all cases exhibit similar operational regions. Note that
while the actual trajectory remains safe, the backup trajectory under the implicit Simplex filter
violates the safety constraint. This is by design, as the trajectories are integrated forward after
taking a simulated probe step. The ASIF approaches are slightly more conservative due to the
presence of the α term in the barrier constraints. This function may be modified to shape the
44
response.
While the Simplex and ASIF methods are most distinctive in terms of behavior, the implicit
and explicit methods are most distinctive in terms of requirements. For instance, the key challenge
in using the implicit methods is the design of the backup controller and the identification of the
backup set. Once these have been identified, it is relatively straightforward to implement either
approach. Likewise, the key challenge in implementing the explicit algorithms is identifying a
large invariant set. The explicit ASIF approach is the only algorithm that does not require any
backup controller to be defined.
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(a) Explicit Simplex filter (RBSF)
(b) Implicit Simplex filter (SBSF)
(c) Explicit active set invariance filter (EASIF)
(d) Implicit active set invariance filter (IASIF)
Figure 2.7: Comparison of algorithms on double integrator system (1.11) with constraint set (1.12)
and U = [−1, 1].
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CHAPTER 3
SAFE AUTONOMOUS RENDEZVOUS PROXIMITY OPERATIONS AND DOCKING
Autonomous rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (ARPOD) are key enablers of missions
such as satellite servicing, active debris removal, and in-space assembly. However, errors in the
control and estimation systems, or failures to account for off-nominal conditions may result in
catastrophic collisions between spacecraft. Safety may potentially be preserved in these cases by
switching to a safety-driven backup system. This chapter develops such a system, with guidance,
control, and estimation schemes designed to safely place an active chaser spacecraft in a parking
orbit around a passive target spacecraft. Natural motion trajectories are considered to identify a
set of passively safe parking orbits under Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) dynamics, and a Mixed
Integer Programming (MIP) formulation is developed to find the optimal transfer trajectories to
this set. The practicality of the estimation and control schemes is demonstrated though simulated
case studies. The guidance algorithm is integrated into a run time assurance (RTA) framework,
which allows real-time enforcement of the safety constraints in a least-intrusive fashion.
3.1 Motivation
In an increasingly crowded space environment, ARPOD operations are envisioned to be integral
to the design of future satellite servicing, active debris removal, and in-space assembly missions.
However, one of the greatest risks in ARPOD missions is the potential for a collision between the
active “chaser” satellite, and the passive “target” satellite. The severity of this risk is demonstrated
by several historic collisions that occurred during rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking
[95, 96, 97, 98].
This research proposes an optimal control technique for safe transfer maneuvers to a safely
defined subset of elliptical natural motion trajectories (eNMTs), referred to as parking orbits.
Closed natural motion trajectories (cNMTs), which include eNMTs as an instance, are periodic
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(i.e. closed), zero-thrust trajectories that occur under linearized relative motion dynamics. They are
attractive for collision avoidance because they are passively invariant; i.e. once a spacecraft enters
a cNMT, it will stay on that trajectory, without the need to consume fuel, until disturbances such
as drag or solar radiation pressure accumulate. The main contribution of this chapter is the devel-
opment of a MIP formulation to plan safety-constrained maneuvers for an active chaser spacecraft
to set of safe eNMTs around a passive target spacecraft. In addition, lower-level controllers are
constructed to regulate to the planned trajectory, and to stabilize the system to the parking orbit set.
One important application of this approach is for it to be used as a backup control system in an
RTA framework. RTA mechanisms typically feature a monitor that evaluates whether the primary
control system is commanding unsafe control actions, and a backup control system that steers the
system back to safety when unsafe behavior is detected. For example, switching to the backup
system may occur when,
1. a human operator watching the system’s performance is uncomfortable with the ARPOD
controller output and activates the recovery maneuver,
2. the onboard RTA monitor detects the ARPOD controller is commanding an unsafe maneuver
and triggers a recovery response, or
3. there is a fault in the ARPOD controller that triggers a recovery response.
Maneuvering the spacecraft to an eNMT parking orbit allows human operators on the ground
to investigate the off-nominal condition while the chaser spacecraft is safely “parked” close to the
inactive target spacecraft. Alternatively the backup controller may be activated only as necessary to
prevent the chaser spacecraft from reaching unsafe states, as shown in the example in Section 3.6.
3.2 Related Work
MIP has been shown to be an effective framework for finding optimal trajectories under various
types of operational and safety constraints [8, 25, 99, 4]. In the spacecraft domain, MIP formula-
tions exist for fuel optimal guidance under plume impingement and avoidance constraints [100],
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complex proximity operations [101], constrained attitude guidance [102], and planning involving
low-speed bouncing maneuvers [94].
The backup control strategy in this chapter is an optimization-based collision avoidance algo-
rithm for close proximity spacecraft operations. Several optimization techniques have also been
proposed for collision avoidance strategies, both at orbital and relative motion scales. The NLP2
algorithm [103] minimizes delta-V and can be configured to include an optional miss distance
constraint with uncertainties in individual or joint covariances. Bombardelli and Henando-Ayuso
[104] developed an approach optimized eigenvalue problem that conducts an impulse collision
avoidance a few orbits prior to the predicted collision to minimize total ∆V . Other optimal con-
trol techniques have examined the use of drag and solar radiation pressure as control inputs for
collision avoidance [105].
At the relative motion dynamics scale, robust control approaches have used model predictive
control and an extended command governor [106], as well as safe positively invariant sets [107].
Stochastic reachability has also been applied to characterize the initial set of states where space-
craft rendezvous and docking maneuvers could be performed safely [108]. This work compares
particle (Monte Carlo) approximations [109, 110] to a convex, overapproximated, reachable set
[111, 112]. While not specifically designed for collision avoidance, recent developments in space-
craft relative motion control and planning [113, 114, 115, 116, 106] inspired the eNMT-based
collision avoidance trajectories in this chapter.
3.3 Preliminaries
3.3.1 Hill’s Frame
The dynamics in this research are based on the rectangular, satellite-centered, relative motion,
Hill’s reference frame. This was initially developed in the 1870s to describe the relative orbit
between two bodies in orbit around a central body [117]. Hill’s frame is also sometimes referred
to as the local-vertical local-horizontal (LVLH) or radial-tangential normal (RTN) frame when
centered on the Earth. Hill’s frame, as depicted in Figure 3.1, is centered on the “target” (also
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called “chief”) satellite, with:





• y-axis ŷ (or êT for “tangential direction”) points in the direction of the velocity vector (ŷ =
êT = êN × êR) of the target satellite, and
• z-axis ẑ (or êN for “normal direction”) points orthogonally out of the orbital plane (ẑ =
êN =
re×ve
||re×ve|| , where re and ve are the position and velocity vectors of the target satellite).
The x and y axes define the orbital plane of the satellite at the center of Hill’s frame, while any
motion along z is outside the orbital plane. In Figure 3.1, ve is the velocity vector of the target
spacecraft orbit, Re is the vector from the planet’s center to the chaser spacecraft, and re is a vector
from the planet’s center and to the location of the target satellite. The relative position of the chaser









Figure 3.1: Hill’s reference frame centered on a target spacecraft and used to describe the relative
motion of a chaser spacecraft conducting ARPOD.
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3.3.2 Clohessy-Wiltshire Equations
The orbital motion of a spacecraft is described by Eq. 3.1, where µ is the gravitational parameter
((3.986004418 ± 0.000000008) ×1014 m3s2 for Earth), Re is a vector from the planet center to the
satellite (Re = re + r), mc is the mass of the satellite, and F = Fxx̂ + Fyŷ + Fzẑ is a vector of








These dynamics can be used to derive and linearize the relative motion dynamics by assuming
the satellites are spherical and roughly equivalent in mass, that masses of the planet and the satel-
lites are constant, that the mass of the satellites are significantly smaller than the mass of the planet,
that gravity is the only force acting on the satellites and planet, that the spacecraft are in circular
orbit, and that the relative distance between the spacecraft is much smaller than the distance from
either spacecraft to the center of the planet (r << Re) [31]. These linearized dynamics are named
after Clohessy and Wiltshire from their 1960 paper [31] and are defined in Hill’s frame as:




v̇y = −2nvx +
Fy
mc




where dotted variables indicate derivatives with respect to time; a is length of the semi-major axis
of the target spacecraft’s orbit; and n is satellite mean motion (n =
√
µ/a3). In this chapter,
n = 0.001027 rad/s is used.
The external forces are assumed to be equal to the applied thrust u = uxx̂+ uyŷ + uzẑ, with u
acting as the control variable. As evident by inspection of these equations, the in-plane dynamics
(involving rx, ry and their derivatives) are decoupled from the out-of-plane dynamics (involving
rz and its derivatives). In addition, the in-plane dynamics are unstable with two eigenvalues at the
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origin and two at ±nj. The out-of-plane dynamics are stable with two eigenvalues at ±nj. The
in-plane dynamics are completely controllable from uy but not controllable from ux, and the out-
of-plane dynamics are controllable from uz. Given that the out-of-plane dynamics are decoupled
and completely controllable with uz, it is convenient to restrict focus to in-plane relative motion.
In state space form, in-plane dynamics are described as:
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (3.3)
with, x = [rx, ry, vx, vy]T ∈ X ⊂ R4 being the state vector, u = [ux, uy]T ∈ U ⊂ R2 being the
control vector, t ∈ R being the time, and
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
3n2 0 0 2n










The guidance and control formulation in this chapter assumes the above dynamics with thrust
limitations given by U = [−umax, umax]2.
3.3.3 Natural Motion Trajectories
Natural Motion Trajectories (NMTs) are solutions to (3.2) (or (3.3)) with all applied forces equal to
zero (u ≡ 0). Open NMTs may be a non-periodic line segment, helix (traveling ellipse), or spiral,
while cNMTs may be ellipses (eNMTs), periodic line segments or stationary points. To create any
cNMT, one must choose an initial state such that vy(0) = −2nrx(0) where n is the mean motion
of the circular orbital trajectory. In addition to this criteria, each cNMT has specific additional
criteria.
• For a cNMT to be a stationary point, rx(0) = rz(0) = vx(0) = vz(0) = 0.
• To create a periodic line segment, rx(0) = vx(0) = 0, rz(0) = csin(ψ), and vz(0) =
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nccos(ψ), where c is the magnitude of the oscillation (1/2 the length of the line segment)
and n is the mean motion as previously defined.
• To create an eNMT, vx(0) = n2 ry(0).
Each of these conditions assumes that the state variables fall within ranges for which the linearized
dynamics developed in the previous section are valid.
3.3.4 Maximum and Absolute Value Assignments with Mixed Integer Programming
Recall from Section 1.4 that integer variables allow for the direct expression of first order logic
over the constraints [118, 3]. This chapter employs a MIP formulation for constrained optimal
guidance of the chaser spacecraft. For this purpose, it is convenient to review the below relations.
Consider scalar variables x̄, x ∈ [xmin, xmax], integer variable ζ ∈ {0, 1} and constant M ≥
max(xmin, xmax). Them the assignment x̄ = |x| is equivalent to the following set of constraints,
x ≤ x̄ ∧ −x ≤ x̄
x ≤Mζ ∧ −x ≤M(1− ζ)
x̄ ≤ x+M(1− ζ) ∧ x̄ ≤ −x+Mζ.
(3.5)
A scalar variable xmax may be assigned the maximum value of two scalar variables in a similar
fashion. Given ζ ∈ {0, 1}, the assignment x3 = max(x1, x2) is equivalent to the constraints,
x1 ≤ x3 ∧ x2 ≤ x3
x1 − x2 ≤Mζ ∧ x2 − x1 ≤M(1− ζ)
x3 ≤ x1 +M(1− ζ) ∧ x3 ≤ x2 +Mζ.
(3.6)
The equivalency of the constraints in (3.5) and (3.6) to their respective assignments is evident in
the expression of a truth table.
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3.3.5 Passive Invariance
Intuitively, a control policy is safe if it prevents the system from visiting undesirable states for all
time, whenever it is possible to do so. As described in Section 1.6, such a notion of safety can be
formalized in terms of guarantees on set invariance. Let CA be the constraint space, which is the
set of all states that satisfy the safety constraints. Then a system is safe with under a given control
law if that control law renders a subset of the constraint space forward invariant. For spacecraft, it
is important to consider a definition of safety that accounts for fuel usage. It is said that a spacecraft
is passively safe if it is in a passively invariant set contained in CA.
Definition 3.3.1 (passively invariant). A closed set S is passively invariant for system (3.3) if the
solution to (3.3) with u ≡ 0 satisfies, x(t0) ∈ S =⇒ ∀t ≥ t0, x(t) ∈ S. 4
Note that if a safe finite-time trajectory can be found with an endpoint that lies in a safe pas-
sively invariant set, then safety can be guaranteed for all time using only the fuel required to
complete the trajectory.
3.4 Safety Constraints
Three safety constraints are defined on the system based on the norms of the position vector r :=
[rx, ry]
T and velocity vector v := [vx, vy]T . First, the collision avoidance constraint,
ϕ1(x) := ‖r‖ − rmin ≥ 0 (3.7)
imposes the requirement that the chaser spacecraft avoid coming within a distance of rmin of the
target spacecraft. Second, the proximity constraint,
ϕ2(x) := rmax − ‖r‖ ≥ 0 (3.8)
requires that the chaser spacecraft stay within a distance of rmax of the target. This distance may
for example be chosen as the maximum distance where the linearization in Eq. (3.3) is considered
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valid. Third, the constraint,
ϕ3(x) := κ1 + κ2‖r‖ − ‖v‖ ≥ 0 (3.9)
introduces a limit on the maximum safe relative speed between chaser and target, as a function of
the separation distance. This chapter assumes values κ1 ≥ 0, and κ2 ≥ 2n. The safety constraints
(3.7)-(3.9) together define the set of safe states,
CS := {x ∈ R4 | ϕi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3}. (3.10)
The trajectory planning formulation considers the l∞ norm case for the safe set definition. The
constraints defining CS are represented visually in Figure 3.2 for rmin = 0.5 km, rmax = 8 km,
κ1 = 1 m/s, and κ2 = 2n s−1.
3.4.1 Identification of Safe Parking Orbit Set
To construct the safe parking orbit set, the set of all eNMTs that are contained within the safe set
CS is considered. Recall that the chaser spacecraft is on an eNMT centered at the origin exactly
when the following constraints are satisfied,
ϑ1(x) := vx −
n
2
ry = 0, (3.11)
ϑ2(x) := vy + 2n rx = 0. (3.12)
Hence, the set of all states on eNMTs centered at the origin (target) is given by,
M = {x ∈ R4 | ϑ1(x) = ϑ2(x) = 0}. (3.13)
55
Since this set consists entirely of cNMTs,M is by nature a passively invariant set. Under the ideal
assumptions of the model, if the chaser can reach this set, it can stay in the set indefinitely without
using fuel. However, note that not all trajectories comprising M are safe. A safe subset of M
—specifically, a passively invariant subset of CS ∩M— may be constructed by restricting this set
to only include the states of eNMTs contained in CS.
Recall that each eNMT has a period of τ = 2π/n and major axis equal to twice the minor axis.









η(b) = {x ∈M|ϑ3(x) = b2} (3.15)
denotes the set of states occupied by an eNMT with semi-minor axis b. Projections of η(b) in the
rx-ry plane are level curves of ϑ3. Projections in the vx-vy plane may be obtained similarly by
substituting rx = −(2n)−1vy, and ry = (0.5n)−1vx into Eq. (3.14). Various simulated projections
of η(b) are shown in Figure 3.2.
The trajectory corresponding to η(b) is safe when,
min
x∈η(b)
ϕi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3. (3.16)














𝜑1 = 0 𝜑3 = 0 𝜑2 = 0𝑡 = 0 s
𝑡 = 451 s
𝑡 = 1080 s
𝑡 = 1530 s
Figure 3.2: Projections of elliptical natural motion trajectories η(b) with b = 560 m, 1706 m,
2853 m, 4000 m, generated by simulating dynamics (3.3) over the horizon τ = 2π/n with initial
conditions x(0) = [0, 2b, nb, 0]T , and u ≡ 0.
and for all κ1 ≥ 0 and κ2 ≥ 2n,
min
x∈η(b)
ϕ3(x) ≥ 0. (3.20)













η(b) = {x ∈M | b2min ≤ ϑ3(x) ≤ b2max}. (3.22)
Note that M̄ ⊆ CS is passively invariant, as it is the union of cNMTs η(b). It is defined by two
equality constraints, and two inequality constraints. A projection of this set for rmin = 0.5 km,
rmax = 8 km is shown in Figure 3.2.
3.5 Safety-Constrained Optimal Transfer Trajectories to Parking Orbit Set
This section formulates the problem of generating safe optimal transfer trajectories of a spacecraft
from an initial state x(0) to the safe parking orbit set M̄. It is shown that the dynamics of the
spacecraft, actuation constraints, and safety constraints are all amenable to approximation with
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piecewise affine constraints. In light of this, the trajectory optimization problem is posed as a MIP.
A discrete time approximation of the dynamics (3.3) is considered over a horizon with sampled
times ti indexed by i ∈ {1, ... , τ}. The period separating all points in the sample horizon is
constant ∆t = ti+1 − ti, and the length of the horizon is T = tτ − t1; the initial reference
time is t1 = 0. The state of the vehicle at the ith time-step is represented by the variables xi =
[rx,i, ry,i, vx,i, vy,i]
T , and control vector is denoted by ui = [ux,i, uy,i]T . Safety is guaranteed over
t ∈ [0, T ] with the requirement that ∀i ∈ {2, ..., τ − 1}, xi ∈ CS. Furthermore, safety is ensured
∀t ≥ T with the constraint xτ ∈ M̄.
Intermediate Point Constraints
Intermediate point constraints enforce that,
xi ∈ CS, i = 2, ..., τ − 1. (3.23)
Recall that the safety set CS is defined by constraints (3.7)-(3.9), which are linear inequalities of
the position and velocity norms. For the case where the l∞ norm is used to define CS, (3.23) may
be represented exactly as a set of mixed integer constraints involving the state variables. This is
apparent when one notes that variable assignments with both the maximum and absolute value
operations can be represented by an equivalent set of mixed integer constraints (see Section 3.3.4).
In this section, we represent assignments of these two operations directly with the understanding
that the corresponding set of MIP constraints may be obtained by applying (3.5), (3.6). Note that
direct assignments such as this are supported by some off-the-shelf optimization interfaces; e.g.
the Python interface to Gurobi [11] is used for the results in this chapter.
Consider,
r̄x,i = abs(rx,i) ∧ r̄y,i = abs(ry,i) (3.24)
v̄x,i = abs(vx,i) ∧ v̄y,i = abs(vy,i) (3.25)
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with i = 2, ..., τ − 1. These constraints set the value of decision variables r̄x,i, r̄y,i, v̄x,i, v̄y,i to
be equal to the absolute values of the corresponding position and velocity components. Variables
r∞,i, v∞,i are set equal to the position and velocity norms respectively with,
r∞,i = max(r̄x,i, r̄x,i) (3.26)
v∞,i = max(v̄y,i, v̄y,i) (3.27)
where i = 2, ..., τ − 1. The safety constraints are constructed with these variables as,
r∞,i − rmin ≥ 0 (3.28)
rmin − r∞,i ≥ 0 (3.29)
κ1 + κ2r∞,i − v∞,i ≥ 0 (3.30)
with i = 2, ..., τ − 1. The set of constraints (3.24)-(3.30) is equivalent to (3.23).
End Point Constraints
End point constraints enforce that,
xi ∈ M̄, i = τ, (3.31)





ry,i = 0, (3.32)
vy,i + 2nrx,i = 0. (3.33)
where i = τ . The nonlinear inequality constraints defining the outer bound on position ϑ3(xτ ) ≤
b2max and inner position bound ϑ3(xτ ) ≥ b2min are approximated conservatively using a finite num-












where j = 1, ..., NQ. Let,
αx,j := (qy,j − qy,j+1)
αy,j := (qx,j − qx,j+1)
γj := αx,jqx,j + αy,jqy,j
then, ∧
j=1,...,NQ
αx,jrx,i + αy,jry,i ≤ γj (3.34)
with i = τ gives a sufficient condition for ϑ3(xτ ) ≤ b2max by ensuring that the position stays in Q.
The constraint ϑ3 ≥ b2min is enforced similarly by requiring that the position avoid the interior of
a polygonal outer approximation of the ellipse defined by ϑ3 = b2min. However, since ϑ3 ≥ b2min is
non-convex, approximating this constraint requires the introduction of integer variables. Consider








where j = 1, ..., NP. Unit normal vectors to the edges are, n̂p,j = [n̂px,j, n̂py,j]T := ∇ϑ3(r)|pj .
Letting ri := [rxi , ryi ]
T , and ζi,j ∈ {0, 1}, the constraints,
∧
j=1,...,NQ












Figure 3.3: Notional depiction of the position constraints defined by the minimum allowable dis-
tance rmin and maximum allowable distance rmax.
∑
j=1,...,NQ
ζi,j ≥ 1 (3.36)
with i = τ and M ∈ R+ (defined sufficiently large as described in Section 1.4) ensure that
ϑ3(xτ ) ≥ b2min. Specifically, (3.35) constrains ζi,j = 0 when the position is on the exterior of the jth
edge of P . The requirement that ri 6∈ P is then represented by (3.36). The constraints developed
in this section restrict xτ to a polytope contained in M̄; consequently, (3.32)-(3.36) =⇒ (3.31).
A notional illustration of the polygons P , Q is shown along with the constraint boundaries in
Figure 3.3.
Example Objective Functions
In practice, the appropriate choice of an objective function depends on the specific needs of the
mission. The proposed methodology does not assume a particular form for the objective. However,
since vehicle efficiency is commonly of critical importance to real-world missions, we find it useful
to review here some common approximations for penalizing actuation using quadratic and linear
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(u2x, i + u
2
y, i)∆t (3.37)
which forms a Mixed Integer Quadratic Program (MIQP). With the introduction of additional
constraints, is also possible to use a peice-wise affine approximation of the Euclidean norm of


















The constraints here approximate the second order cone constraints Gi ≥ ‖ui‖2, i = 1, ... , τ with
an NJ sided polygon. Finally, the cost function J =
∑τ
i=1 ‖ui‖p with p = 1 or p = ∞ may be
represented with a piece-wise linear cost function; see Chapter 9 of [4].
Mixed Integer Program
Given the initial state x(0) = xinit, the states and control inputs of a safe reference trajectory
leading to the safe parking orbits set M̄ are given by the solution to the optimal control problem,
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s.t. xi+1 = Adtxi +Bdtui, i = 1, ..., τ − 1
ux,i, ux,i ∈ [−umax, umax], i = 1, ..., τ − 1
xi = xinit, i = 1
(3.24)− (3.30), i = 2, ..., τ − 1
(3.32)− (3.36) i = τ
(3.39)
where Adt = eA∆t is the state transition matrix, Bdt =
∫ ∆t
0
eA(t−τ)Bdτ , the decision vector z
contains the states xi (with i = 1, ..., τ ) and control inputs ui (with i = 1, ..., τ − 1), in addition
to the supplemental binary and continuous variables defined in the constraints. Note that the MIP
finds both the most efficient parking orbit within the specified range, and the optimal trajectory
to that orbit. This program may be modified for the docking problem by removing the collision
avoidance constraints, and replacing the endpoint constraint with xτ = 0.
3.5.1 Regulatory Controllers
Regulation to Planned Trajectory
The MIP developed in the previous section returns a set of τ − 1 control inputs, along with the τ
corresponding trajectory states. The ideal state at time t is tracked between updates using a Linear
Quadratic Regulator (LQR) as the ancillary control law. The net control at t is,
u(t) = u∗(t) +Klqr(x
∗(t)− x(t)) (3.40)
where Klqr ∈ R2×4 is the LQR gain matrix, u∗ ∈ R2, x∗ ∈ R4 are the ideal control and state at
time t, taken from a linear interpolation of the control and state solutions returned from the MIP.
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Experiments use state cost matrix Q = 0.001 I4 and control cost matrix R = 1000 I2 to generate
Klqr.
Stabilization to Parking Orbit Set
The MIP and the regulatory controller developed in the above sections serve the purpose of safely
bringing the spacecraft to the safe parking orbit set M̄. Once the chaser spacecraft has successfully
reached this set, the spacecraft switches to a simpler control law that stabilizes the system to the

























globally stabilizes (3.41) to the origin for K > 0; equivalently, it globally stabilizes (3.3) is to
the setM. The parameter K is a tunable gain parameter that affects the strength of the response.
Experiments in this chapter use K = 0.6. Note that since (3.42) drives the system toM, and not
the safe subset M̄, it may be necessary in practice to temporarily switch back to the MIP controller
if sufficient drift occurs.
3.6 Simulated Case Studies
This section considers case studies for a system with mc = 50 kg, umax = 0.5 N, n = 0.001027
rad/s. In all cases, the safety constraints are defined with, rmin = 0.5 km, rmax = 8 km, κ1 = 0.5
m/s, κ2 = 2n s−1, NP = NQ = 12. In the first example, the performance of the planning
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Figure 3.4: Projected trajectories for the deterministic system from initial states with ry = vx =
vy = 0, and rx ∈ {500 + 1875i}i=0,...,4 m using the trajectory planning formulation (3.39) with
T = 1000 s and τ = 101, and stabilizing controller (3.42).
Table 3.1: Cost Values






and control algorithms developed in Section 3.5 are tested under simulated noise and estimation
uncertainty. In the second example, the MIP is used to construct an RTA mechanism that filters the
input of an unsafe primary controller in such a way that preserves safety of the system.
3.6.1 Cost Comparison
This section compares the performance of the planning formulation developed in Section 3.5 under
simulated noise. Ideal trajectories are generated with the MIP (3.39) using cost function (5.31),
horizon T = 1000 s, and τ = 101 steps. LQR regulation to the ideal states is considered, as
described in Section 3.5.1. Though it is not included in the comparison here, one may also consider
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receding horizon formulations. The stabilizing controller from Eq. (3.42) takes over at the end of
the planning horizon — i.e. once t = T and the chaser spacecraft has reached the parking orbit set
M̄.
Simulations are conducted from initial states with ry = vx = vy = 0, and rx ∈ {501 +
1874.5i}i=0,...,4 m. The controller is sampled at 0.1 Hz, and the system is simulated for 3500 s.
The simulated trajectories for the ideal case are shown in Figure 3.4. The simulated cost for the
cases with and without uncertainty are indicated in Table 3.1. Here, the ideal cost is taken from
the reference control points from the MIP, and the full cost case is the total cost with the noise and
estimation model included, and the regulatory controllers being used to mitigate the resulting state
error. The costs for the case including noise effects represents an average over 10 runs. The values
indicate that the control system performs well under effects of noise and uncertainty. Note that for
the closest case —where a relatively low thrust is commanded over a long time period— most of
the actuation effort results from the task of rejecting noise.
3.6.2 Run Time Assurance with MIP-based Backup Controller
We now illustrate the use of the backup controller in the SBSF algorithm (see Section 2.3.3). Here
the trajectory planner Eq. (3.39) is used to override the desired actions of a primary controller
when necessary for preserving safety. A nominal control law unom(x) = Kx attempts to drive
the chaser spacecraft from the stationary point at x = [0,−2000 m, 0, 0] to the stationary point
at x = [0, 750 m, 0, 0]. The matrix K is an LQR gain matrix generated with state cost matrix
Q = 0.0005 I4 and control cost matrix R = 10000 I2. The trajectory under this control law is
shown as the grey line in Figure 3.5. It is apparent from these plots that a direct application of
unom results in a violation of the collision avoidance and relative speed constraints (Eq. (3.7), Eq.
(3.9) respectively).
An RTA filter is constructed such that at any state x, the applied control is either the desired
control input unom(x), or the backup control input ub(x), where ub is given by the solution to
Eq. (3.39). Whether or not the desired input is accepted at state x1 is based on whether a safe
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Figure 3.5: Projected trajectories from x = [0,−2 km, 0, 0]T to x = [0, 0.75 km, 0, 0]T over a 2400
s period. The trajectories without RTA are grey. The trajectories with RTA are blue on iterations
where the primary controller unom provides the input, and red when ub provides the input. The
backup trajectories (cyan) are shown at 8 s intervals.
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trajectory can be found starting with this input. Specifically, let x̃2 be the estimated state after
applying unom(x1) for ∆t seconds, and consider the MIP solved with initial condition x̃2. The
backup control ub(x1) is commanded if (i) the MIP is infeasible, or (ii) if any of the points on the
backup trajectory (i.e. the solution states) come within 0.05 m/s of the constraint defined by (3.9),
or 5 m of the constraints defined by (3.7), (3.8). The first condition ensures that the chaser will only
move to new states if it can find a safe solution from that state. The second condition makes the
formulation more robust to noise and uncertainty by adding a buffer region on the constraints. Note
that if the chaser spacecraft is perturbed into a region where the MIP cannot find a safe solution,
then backup control inputs ub may be provided by using (3.40) to regulate to the most recent safe
trajectory found.
The RTA is tested with the MIP using a T = 50 s horizon composed of τ = 50 points. As
illustrated in Figure 3.5, the RTA is effective at preventing violations in the safety constraints.
Note that while the RTA enforces constraints, the task of successfully reaching the goal location




RUN TIME ASSURED SPACECRAFT ATTITUDE CONTROL UNDER
NONDETERMINISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
This chapter presents a summary of the development and testing of a Run Time Assurance (RTA)
filter for a torque-controlled spacecraft in free rotational motion, subject to line-of-sight con-
straints. A nondeterministic dynamical model is considered and an RTA filter is constructed using
recent results from reachability theory in addition to optimization-based computation of invariant
sets. Safety guarantees exist when a disturbance torque on the spacecraft is bounded within a de-
fined range. The practicality of the approach is demonstrated with an application on a hardware
testbed.
4.1 Preliminaries
This section considers the dynamics
ẋ = F (x, u, w) (4.1)
with state x ∈ X ⊆ Rn, control input u ∈ U ⊆ Rm, and disturbance input w ∈ W ⊂ Rm. The sets
X , U and W denote the state, control and disturbance spaces of (4.1), respectively, and we assume
throughout that the disturbance space W := [w,w] is a hyperrectangle defined by the endpoints
w,w ∈ Rp.
We denote by Φ(t;x, u, w) the (assumed unique) state of (4.1) reached at time twhen beginning
at state x ∈ X at time 0 and evolving subject to the control input policy u(t;x) ∈ U and the
disturbance signal w(t) ∈ W . Similarly, given a control policy u(t;x),
R(t;A, u) := {Φ(t;x, u, w) | x ∈ A,w : [0, t)→ W} (4.2)
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denotes the time-t reachable set of (4.1) from the initial set A ⊂ X under u. In the special instance
where (4.1) does not depend on u, so that
ẋ = F (x,w), (4.3)
we omit the third inputs of Φ and R so that Φ(t;x,w) denotes the transition map of (4.3) and
R(t;A) denotes the time-t reachable set. Further, when (4.1) does not depend on w the system is
said to be deterministic; otherwise the system is said to be nondeterministic.
4.1.1 Review of Safety for Nondeterministic Dynamical Systems
The system (4.1) is paired with a safety constraint defined on the state ϕ(x) ≥ 0 and a constraint set
CA ⊂ X consisting of all states satisfying this constraint, i.e. CA := {x ∈ X |ϕ(x) ≥ 0}. Feedback
controller safety is formalised by a set invariance requirement on the closed-loop dynamics, as
discussed next.
Definition 4.1.1 (robust forward invariance). Given a system ẋ = F (x,w), as in (4.3), the set
A ⊆ X is robustly forward invariant for (4.3) if Φ(t;x,w) ∈ A for all x ∈ A, all t ≥ 0 and
all piecewise continuous disturbance inputs w : [0,∞) → W . This is extended to controlled
dynamical systems as well so that A is robustly forward invariant for (4.1) under u(t;x) when
Φ(t;x, u, w) ∈ A for all t ≥ 0. 4
Definition 4.1.2 (robust safety). A set of states CS ⊂ X is said to be safe with respect to a nonde-
terministic dynamical system, a control law, and a constraint set CA, if that set is a robustly forward
invariant subset of the allowable set. That is, if CS ⊆ CA and x(t0) ∈ CS =⇒ ∀ ≥ t0, x(t) ∈ CS
for all realizations of the nondeterminism. Furthermore, if CS is a safe set, then any state in CS is
said to be a safe state. 4
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4.1.2 Efficient Reachability Analysis via Mixed Monotonicity
Reachablity analysis for dynamical systems consists of identifying a set of future system states
given a set of initial system states and certain metrics on the class of disturbances in consideration.
Modern advances in reachability have produced computationally efficient techniques for approxi-
mating reachable sets, with computational speeds suitable for e.g. computing reachable sets in the
control-loop and enforcing safe behavior online from these predictions [121, 122, 123].
Of particular interest to this work, the mixed monotonicity property of dynamical systems has
been applied for the efficient overapproximation of reachable sets using hyperrectangles as de-
scribed below. A dynamical system, possibly subject to a disturbance input, is mixed monotone
when there exists a related decomposition function that separates the initial system dynamics into
cooperative and competitive state interactions [124]. Mixed monotonicity applies to continuous-
time systems [125, 126, 127, 128, 129], discrete-time systems [130, 131], controlled systems [132,
124], and systems with disturbances [133, 132, 131]; however, for ease of exposition, we consider
mainly in this section the uncontrolled continuous-time dynamics (4.3).
Definition 4.1.3 (Mixed Monotonicity [124]). Given a locally Lipschitz continuous function d :
X ×X → Rn, the system (4.3) is mixed monotone with respect to d if all of the following hold:
1. For all x ∈ X and all w
d(x,w, x, w) = F (x,w).
2. For all i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n}, with i 6= j,
∂di
∂xj
(x,w, x̂, ŵ) ≥ 0
for all x, x̂ ∈ X, and all w, ŵ such that ∂d
∂x
exists.
3. For all i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n},
∂di
∂x̂j
(x,w, x̂, ŵ) ≤ 0
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for all x, x̂ ∈ X, and all w, ŵ such that ∂d
∂x̂
exists.
4. For all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and all j ∈ {1, · · · , p},
∂di
∂wj
(x,w, x̂, ŵ) ≥ 0 ≥ ∂di
∂ŵj
(x,w, x̂, ŵ)





When (4.1) is mixed monotone with respect to d, d is a decomposition function for (4.1) and
ẋ
˙̂x
 = E(x, x̂) :=
d(x,w, x̂, w)
d(x̂, w, x, w)
 (4.4)
is the embedding system relative to d. An important feature of mixed monotone systems that we
exploit in this chapter is that overapproximations of reachable sets can be efficiently computed via





with x, x̂ ∈ Rn, then the hyperrectangular set formed by the first and last n components of Φ is
denoted by
JΦK := [x, x̂]. (4.6)






Proposition 4.1.1. Let (4.3) be mixed monotone with respect to d and choose A := [x, x] ⊂ X . If
ΦE(t; (x, x)) ∈ X ×X for all t ∈ [0, T ] then
R(T ;A) ⊆ JΦE(T ; (x, x))K, (4.8)
where ΦE(t; a) is the state transition function of the embedding system (4.4). ♦
The proof of Proposition 4.1.1 appears in [124] and also in [132] and [134].
Proposition 4.1.1 provides an efficient procedure for computing reachable sets for (4.1) via a
single simulation of the deterministic embedding system (4.4). The main challenge in this ap-
proach, however, is in identifying a suitable decomposition function for (4.3); generally, a mixed
monotone system will be mixed monotone with respect to many decomposition functions, however,
certain decomposition functions may provide more/less conservative approximations of reachable
sets than others when used with Proposition 4.1.1. This is the main point of study in [135] where
the authors show that all systems of the form (4.3), bearing a locally Lipshitz continuous vector
field, are mixed monotone with respect to a unique tight decomposition function that provides a
tighter approximation of reachable sets than any other decomposition function for (4.3).
Proposition 4.1.2. [135] Any system of the form (4.3) is mixed monotone with respect to d con-
structed elementwise according to











Fi(y, z) if (x̂, ŵ)  (x,w).
(4.9)
Moreover, for all other decomposition functions d′ for (4.3) and any initial set A = [x, x],
R(T ;A) ⊆ JΦE(t; (x, x))K ⊆ JΦE′(t; (x, x))K (4.10)
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where ΦE and ΦE′ denote the state transition functions of the embedding systems constructed from
d and d′, respectively. ♦
As posed in (4.9), computing a tight decomposition function requires solving a generally non-
convex optimization problem for each quadruple (x,w, x̂, ŵ). However, in certain instances it is
possible to compute a tight decomposition function in closed form; see [135] for representative
examples. Regardless, the general computational infeasibility of (4.9) implies that it is of limited
direct use computationally and, in practice, decomposition functions are generally not obtained
using Proposition 4.1.2. For this reason, decomposition functions constructed from other means
can be preferable; see [132, 136] for an algorithm for computing decomposition functions for sys-
tems with uniformly bounded Jacobian matrices and see [134] for an algorithm for computing
decomposition functions for systems defined by polynomial vector fields.
4.1.3 Quaternions
Consider i, j, k be defined such that,
i2 + j2 + k2 = ijk = −1 (4.11)
A quaternion q ∈ H ⊂ R4 consists of four parameters q = [q0, q1, q2, q3]T such that
q = q0 + q1i+ q2j + q3k (4.12)
and these parameters may be used to represent rotations, e.g.
q = cos(α/2) + sin(α/2)(u1i+ u2j + u3k) (4.13)
where u1, u2, u3 are the components of a unit vector defining an axis of rotation and α is the angle
of rotation about that axis. Given a vector p = [p1, p2, p3] ∈ R3, and a vector r = [r1, r2, r3] ∈ R3











Figure 4.1: Depiction of spacecraft body frame FB and inertial frame FI.
may be used to form a rotation matrix:
R(q) =

(1− 2q22 − 2q23) 2(q1q2 + q0q3) 2(q1q3 − q0q2)
2(q1q2 − q0q3) (1− 2q21 − 2q23) 2(q2q3 + q0q1)
2(q1q3 + q0q2) 2(q2q3 − q0q1) (1− 2q21 − 2q22)
 . (4.14)
such that r = R(q) p.
4.2 Safety and Dynamics for Spacecraft Attitude Control
4.2.1 Spacecraft Attitude Dynamics
The system of interest consists of a torque-controlled spacecraft in unconstrained rotational motion.
The spacecraft is modeled with state x = [qT , ωT ]T ∈ R7 and control input u ∈ U ⊂ R3, where
the orientation of the spacecraft is captured by the quaternion vector q ∈ H ⊂ R4, the angular
velocity is captured by ω ∈ R3, and u describes an applied torque input. The quaternion vector
q = [q0, q1, q2, q3]
T defines the orientation of a body-fixed reference frame FB with respect to an
inertial frame FI, and the components of ω = [ω1, ω2, ω3]T and u = [u1, u2, u3]T are expressed in
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the body frame FB. A depiction of the axes is shown in Figure 4.1. We let FI := (O, Î , Ĵ , K̂) and
FB := (O, î, ĵ, k̂) so that, without loss of generality, the origin of the inertial frame O is the same
as that of the body frame and the unit vectors î, ĵ, k̂ and Î , Ĵ , K̂ form right-handed orthogonal
bases for FB and FI, respectively, i.e. î× ĵ = k̂ and Î × Ĵ = K̂.
The dynamics of the spacecraft are
q̇ = Q(q)ω
ω̇ = J−1(−ω × Jω + u+ w)
(4.15)
where the bounded, nondeterministic input variable w ∈ W ⊂ R3 models external torque pertur-











and J ∈ R3×3 is the inertia matrix of the spacecraft taken with respect to FB. The inertia matrix is
not assumed to be diagonal.
4.2.2 Line-of-Sight Constraint
Safety of the system is defined by a line-of-sight (LOS) constraint that restricts the attitude of the
vehicle so that a boresight direction lies within some maximum angle of a defined safe direction.
Let b̂ ∈ R3 be a body-fixed unit vector aligned with the boresight direction, and ĉ ∈ R3 be an
inertially-fixed unit vector defining a safe pointing direction for b̂. The LOS angle β ∈ [0, π] rad is
defined as the angle subtended between these two vectors and the safety constraint is





Figure 4.2: Depiction of parameters defining safe configuration. b̂ is the boresight vector, ĉ is the
safe direction, and β is the line-of-sight angle. Note that β > π
2
so that the system is constrained
to remain outside of an avoid cone (red) centered on −ĉ.
where βmax ∈ [0, π] rad. If b̂ is expressed in the coordinates of a body-fixed frame FB and ĉ is
expressed in the coordinates of an inertial frame FI, then
cos(β) = ĉ TR(q) b̂ (4.18)
where q ∈ H ⊂ R4 is a quaternion defining the rotation from FI to FB, and R : H → SO(3) is
given by (4.14). Note that cos(β) represents the projection of the boresight direction onto the safe
axis. In the case where β < π
2
, the boresight direction is restricted to a cone centered around ĉ
and in the case where β > π
2
, it is constrained to lie outside of a cone centered around −ĉ. The
geometry is depicted in Figure 4.2.
The safety constraint can be greatly simplified with a convenient choice of frames. In this
chapter we assume, without loss of generality, that FB is defined such that b̂ = k̂ = [0, 0, 1]T and
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FI is defined such that ĉ = K̂ = [0, 0, 1]T . In this case, it is clear that
cos(β) = 1− 2q21 − 2q22, (4.19)
and the safety constraint (4.17) is equivalently represented as
ϕ(x) := 1− cos(βmax)− 2q21 − 2q22 ≥ 0. (4.20)
The set of all states that satisfy this constraint is referred to as the constraint set and is denoted by
CA := {x ∈ X |ϕ(x) ≥ 0} (4.21)
and the boundary of this set is
∂CA := {x ∈ CA |ϕ(x) = 0}. (4.22)
As discussed previously, there will generally exist states in CA for which a departure is inevitable.
A safe set of states consists of a subset of the constraint set that is robustly forward invariant under
a given control law.
4.2.3 Backup Controller
In this section a backup controller (or recovery controller) ub : X → U is constructed to drive the
system to an invariant subset of the constraint set CA. Noting that ϕ(x) is maximized when β = 0
and that invariant points occur whenever ω = 0, a controller is introduced that stabilizes the system
to this configuration. The backup controller for the system is
ub(x) = σ(ω × Jω − kpJη − kdJω), (4.23)
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The purpose of the saturation function σ : Rm → U is to bound all inputs in Rm to the admissible
input set U = [−umax, umax]3, while approximating the input within this domain; i.e. σ(u) ∈ U
for all u ∈ Rm and u ≈ σ(u) when u ∈ U .
4.3 Mixed Monotonicity and Reachability Analysis for Systems with Outputs
Before presenting the main result in Section 4.4, we first present several theoretical results related
to the mixed monotonicity of spacecraft systems. We begin by showing that the system (4.15) is
mixed monotone, and that the quaternion dynamics are mixed monotone with a tight decomposition
function. Next, we explore conservatism in the approximation of reachable sets for (4.15) and we
present one technique for reducing conservatism in the application of Proposition 4.1.1 based on
the results of [137].
4.3.1 Decomposing the Spacecraft Dynamics
The RTA architecture, presented later in Section 4.4, requires decomposition functions for two
dynamical systems: the open-loop dynamics
q̇ = Q(q)ω (4.26)
ω̇ = −J−1(ω × Jω) + J−1u+ J−1w, (4.27)
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presented previously as system (4.15), where now u ∈ U is assumed constant, and the closed-loop
backup dynamics
q̇ = Q(q)ω (4.28)
ω̇ = −J−1(ω × Jω) + J−1σ(ω × Jω − kpJη − kdJω) + J−1w (4.29)
that come from applying (4.23) to (4.15). As such, the first result is to show that both the open-
loop dynamics (4.26)–(4.27) and the backup dynamics (4.28)–(4.29) are mixed monotone with
decomposition functions given in closed form.
Proposition 4.3.1. The open-loop dynamics (4.26)–(4.27) are mixed monotone. ♦
Proposition 4.3.2. The backup dynamics (4.28)–(4.29) are mixed monotone. ♦
We construct decomposition functions for (4.26)–(4.27) and (4.28)–(4.29) using an iterative
process, whereby individual decompositions are constructed for each monomial of polynomial dy-
namics. Using this approach, we find that the quaternion dynamics q̇ = Q(q)ω, which appears
as both (4.27)/(4.29), is mixed monotone with a tight decomposition function when the term ω is
viewed as a disturbance input. Access to a tight decomposition function (even for solely the quater-
nion dynamics) provides relative confidence that performance cannot be improved substantially
when other decomposition functions are used with Proposition 4.1.1 and, since ϕ(x) is dependant
only on q1 and q2, tight approximations in the quaternion coordinates of (4.15) are paramount.
4.3.2 Reducing Conservatism in Mixed Monotone Reachable Set Approximations
Unlike the monotonicity property of dynamical systems, which can be applied to compute e.g. the
tightest hyperrectangle containing a reachable set [125], the application of the mixed monotonicity
property is known to generally result in conservative reachable set approximations. This is the main
point of study in [137] where the authors identify four main kinds of conservatism in the application
of Proposition 4.1.1, and we have discussed already how some conservatism is mitigated when a
tight decomposition function is used in the procedure [135]. A second solution posited in [137] for
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reducing conservatism in the application of the mixed monotonicity property involves considering
a linear transformation of the dynamics. That is, rather than apply Proposition 4.1.1 directly to
ẋ = F (x,w), one can instead consider a linear transformation on the initial system statespace
x′ = Tx for some nonsingular transformation matrix T ∈ Rn×n and apply Proposition 4.1.1 to the
transformed dynamics
ẋ′ = T−1F (Tx′, w). (4.30)
A key observation in [137] is that applying Proposition 4.1.1 to (4.30) allows for computing par-
allelotope reachable set approximations for the initial system (4.3) and can be used to reduce
conservatism in the approach.
In this section, we revisit the open-loop spacecraft dynamics (4.26)–(4.27) and the closed-loop
backup dynamics (4.28)–(4.29). We consider, in particular, a state transformation on the angular
velocity
ω′ = Jω. (4.31)
so that the open-loop spacecraft dynamics (4.26)–(4.27) become
q̇ = Q(q)J−1ω′ (4.32)
ω̇′ = −J−1ω′ × ω′ + u+ w, (4.33)
and so that the closed-loop backup dynamics (4.28)–(4.29) become
q̇ = Q(q)J−1ω′ (4.34)
ω̇′ = −J−1ω′ × ω′ + σ(J−1ω′ × ω′ − kpJη − kdω′) + w. (4.35)
Both (4.32)–(4.33) and (4.34)–(4.35) are mixed monotone, and the state transformation (4.31) is





(𝜑 𝑥 ≥ 0)











Figure 4.3: Topological depiction of constraint set CA, safe terminal set Cb, safe backwards image
CS, probe set Xp, and reachable set overapproximations (RSOs) X bk .
4.4 Run Time Assurance Approach
This section develops the Mixed Monotone Simplex Architecture (MiMoSa), an RTA-based ap-
proach for enforcing safety constraints. The algorithm is applied to the spacecraft system (4.15)
and the LOS constraint (4.20). The objective is to define a run time assured control law uact :
X × U → U that switches to the recovery controller ub as necessary to prevent constraint vi-
olations. Potential constraint violations are detected by determining whether or not an overap-
proximation of the reachable set around the recovery trajectory is contained in the constraint set
over a finite-time, and that all possible endpoints terminate in a predefined safe terminal set. The
reachable set overapproximation (RSO) is obtained from a finite-time simulation of the embedding
dynamics, as described in Section 4.1.2. Section 4.4.1 describes a safe terminal set contained in
the constraint set, and Section 4.4.2 defines a larger safe set from the states that can safely reach
the terminal set under the recovery maneuver. Finally, Section 4.4.3 presents the RTA control law
and its associated safety guarantees.
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4.4.1 Safe Terminal Set
The safe terminal set Cb provides a sufficient condition for terminating the online RTA look-ahead.
Such a set is generally computed offline, either analytically or via optimization techniques, and
inserted into the RTA filtering mechanism as an assurance that the backup controller will lead
to safety. The set should be robustly invariant, meaning that the set is still invariant even when
uncertainties and disturbances in the system model and input signal(s) are present.
A Lyapunov function is used to guide the computation of the invariant set via an optimization
procedure. Specifically, the safe terminal set is given by
Cb = {x ∈ X |hb(x) ≥ 0} (4.36)
where hb(x) = γ−V (x) with V (x) being a Lyapunov function for the dynamics under the backup
controller on the domain where β < π, and the positive constant γ > 0 is chosen such that
Cb ⊆ CA.
4.4.2 Robustly Safe Backward Image of the Terminal Set
While Cb forms a safe set under ub, the Lyapunov-based approach yields a set that is very con-
servative, and therefore not practical for use directly in an RTA framework. That is, an RTA that
bounds the system trajectories to Cb would be overly restrictive. However, Cb can be utilized in a
way that grants the system access to a much larger implicitly defined safe set via the trajectories of
the embedding system. The goal of this section is to define such a set. Specifically, we introduce a
set CS such that (i) CS is robustly forward invariant under ub, and (ii) it is possible to verify whether
a particular subset of X is contained in CS using the information obtained from integrating the
embedding state over a finite-time horizon [0, T ] ⊂ R. For this purpose it is useful to recall that
the embedding state provides an overapproximation of the forward reachable set of a system; see
Proposition 4.1.1 for details. Given an embedding system, a backup controller, and a safe terminal
set under this backup controller, such a set is defined as follows:
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Definition 4.4.1 (robustly safe backward image). The robustly safe backward image (RSBI) of
a set Cb is defined with respect to the time horizon [0, T ] ⊂ R, a backup controller ub, and an
embedding system (4.4) as
CS := {x ∈ X | ∃t∗ ∈ [0, T ] s.t. ϑ1(x, t∗) ∧ ϑ2(x, t∗)} (4.37)
where,
ϑ1(x, t
∗) : ∀ t ∈ [0, t∗], JΦEub(t; (x, x))K ⊆ CA
ϑ2(x, t
∗) : JΦEub(t
∗; (x, x))K ⊆ Cb
with Cb is defined as in Section 4.4.1, and ΦEub(t; a) is the state transition function of the embedding
system derived from the closed-loop dynamics (4.15) under the controller ub. 4
The endpoint constraint ϑ2(x, t∗) encodes the condition that the reachable set overapproxima-
tion (RSO) is contained in Cb by some time t∗ ∈ [0, T ], and the intermediate point constraint
ϑ1(x, t
∗) encodes that the RSO is contained in CA until that time. As stated in the following propo-
sition, the RSBI defines a safe set.
Proposition 4.4.1 (Safety of the RSBI under ub). Consider the RBSI CS defined by (4.37) with
respect to the terminal set Cb described in Section 4.4.2, the constraint set CA defined by (4.20),
the embedding system (4.4), and the control law ub given by (4.23). Then, CS is robustly forward
invariant under the closed-loop dynamics of (4.15) with respect to ub. Furthermore, CS ⊆ CA. ♦
Proof. By the intermediate condition ϑ1, if x ∈ CS then JΦEub(t, (x, x))K ⊆ CA for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Since Rub(t;x) ⊆ JΦEub(t, (x, x))K, it is clear that Rub(tk;x) ⊆ CS for all t ∈ [0, T ]. By the
endpoint condition ϑ2, x ∈ CS implies that Rub(T ;x) ⊆ Cb. Since Cb is a robustly forward
invariant subset of CA, it is clear that for all t ≥ T ,Rub(tk;x) ⊆ Cb ⊆ CA.
Intuitively, the proposition guarantees that for any initial condition in CS, the closed-loop sys-
tem under ub will continue to satisfy the LOS constraint for all t ≥ 0.
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Approximation of the RSBI
The intermediate constraints on the RSBI are defined on the embedding trajectory ΦEub(t; (x, x))
over the finite-time horizon [0, T ]. However, since [0, T ] is a continuous interval, this amounts to
verifying an infinite set of constraints. In practice, it is necessary to approximate CS by evaluating
the constraints at a discrete set of points along the interval. While other choices are possible,
a reasonable set of points for the discretization corresponds to the instants in time at which the
controller updates. Given the controller update period ∆t, and using zero as a reference time, a
K-step finite-time horizon is defined as
TK := {t ∈ R | t = (k − 1)∆t, k = 1, ..., K } (4.38)
where by design: (K − 1)∆t = T . Furthermore, an infinite-horizon is defined as
T∞ = {t ∈ R | t = k∆t, k ∈ Z≥0}. (4.39)
Importantly, the embedding state can be obtained at these points by numerically integrating the
embedding system dynamics.
Remark 4.4.1. If the constraints are tightened in a way that assures trajectories do not leave be-
tween the time instants in TK (see for example [76]), then the approximation of CS is robustly
forward invariant under ub. The potential constraint violation between time-steps is assumed to be
negligible in this research and, as such, no distinction is made between the RSBI and the approxi-
mation described in this section. Both are denoted with CS. 4
Test for Set Containment (Easter Egg)
In this section, a sufficient condition is developed for verifying that a rectangular set X := [x, x] is
contained in CS using a finite-time simulation of the embedding system. The flow of the embedding
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system under ub from this initial set is denotedxbk
xbk
 := ΦEub(tk; (x, x)) (4.40)

































The RSO of X that is obtained from the embedding system flow under ub is denoted as,
X bk := JΦEub(tk; (x, x))K. (4.43)
A test for containment of X in CS is given by1:
[∃ k∗ ∈ {1, ..., K} s.t. ϑ3(X , k∗) ∧ ϑ4(X , k∗)] =⇒ [X ⊆ CS] (4.44)
where
ϑ3(X , k∗) : ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , k∗}, X bk ⊆ CA
ϑ4(X , k∗) : X bk∗ ⊆ Cb
(4.45)
This test is valid due to a well known nesting property of the embedding system; see [124] for
further details. To evaluate ϑ3(X , k∗), we note that the following are equivalent
(i) X bk ⊆ CA (ii) min
x∈Xbk
ϕ(x) ≥ 0 (4.46)
1In this context, the set CS refers to the approximation of the RSBI, which underapproximates the RSBI under
appropriate assumptions on the step size and tightening of the constraints, as discussed in Remark 4.4.1.
86
where ϕ(x) is given by (4.20). It can be shown that the minimum is,
min
x∈Xbk
ϕ(x) = 1− cos(βmax)− 2 max(q21,k, q
2
1,k)− 2 max(q22,k, q
2
2,k) (4.47)
Similarly, to evaluate ϑ4(X , k∗), it is observed that the following are equivalent
(i) X bk∗ ⊆ Cb (ii) min
x∈Xbk∗
hb(x) ≥ 0. (4.48)
4.4.3 Algorithm
The presented control law is defined such that the desired input udes ∈ U is applied whenever it
can be verified that the input will not result in a departure from the RSBI, and it will be replaced
with the input from the recovery controller ub otherwise. Specifically, safety is assessed by taking
a probe step under the desired input, and determining if all states reachable under this step are safe;
i.e. contained in CS. Given an initial state x0 ∈ X , the probe set is defined as
Xp := JΦE(∆t; (x0, x0), udes)K, (4.49)
where ΦE(t; a, u) is the state transition function of the embedding system derived from the open-
loop dynamics of (4.15) with the applied control input u. Note that this set is an overapproximation







ϑsafe(Xp) : [∃ k∗ ∈ {1, ..., K} s.t. ϑ3(Xp, k∗) ∧ ϑ4(Xp, k∗)]. (4.51)
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As described in Section 4.4.2, ϑsafe(Xp) can be evaluated with the information obtained from a
simulation of the embedding system over TK . The safety guarantee for this controller is stated in
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.1 (Safety of the RSBI under uact). Consider the initial state x(0) ∈ X , the times
tk ∈ T∞, and the control law uact described by (4.50) and defined with respect to the horizon TK .
The system (4.15) under uact obeys the following property,
x(0) ∈ CS =⇒ ∀tk ∈ T∞, x(tk) ∈ CS (4.52)
♦
Proof. Suppose ad absurdum that the implication in (4.52) is false. Then, there must exist some
k ∈ Z>0 such that
x(tk) ∈ CS ∧ x(tk+1) 6∈ CS (4.53)
The control input at tk is uact(x(tk), udes) which must take a value in the set {udes, ub(x(tk))}.
Suppose that uact = udes, then x(tk+1) ∈ Xp and since x(tk+1) 6∈ CS, we know that Xp 6⊆ CS.
However, in order to have chosen uact = udes, it must be true that ϑ3(Xp)∧ ϑ4(Xp), which implies
that Xp ⊆ CS. Since this is not possible, it is apparent that uact could not be equal to udes. Now
suppose that uact = ub(x(tk)), then Rub(∆t;x(tk)) 6⊆ CS since x(tk+1) ∈ Rub(∆t;x(tk)) and
x(tk+1) 6∈ CS. However, by Proposition 4.4.1, Rub(∆t;x(tk)) must be contained in CS as x(tk) ∈
CS. Hence uact can not be equal to ub. Since uact cannot take a value causing a departure from CS,
we have arrived at a contradiction. Consequently, it is clear that Theorem 4.4.1 must be true.
Informally, if the system starts in a safe configuration (x(0) ∈ CS), then it will stay safe for all
time. In addition, since ub stabilizes the system to Cb ⊆ CA, it is apparent that if the system starts
in an unsafe configuration, then it will be driven to a safe configuration, assuming the initial state
is in the region of attraction of Cb under ub.
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Figure 4.4: ASTROS vehicle with laser oriented along the boresight direction b̂ and avoid cone
constraint defined such that the laser does not enter the ring.
4.5 Experimental Demonstration on ASTROS Testbed
The RTA is tested in the Autonomous Spacecraft Testing of Robotic Operations in Space (AS-
TROS) facility at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The spacecraft is controlled with 12 pres-
surized air thrusters, arranged in a 3-3-3-3 configuration. A linear program is used to allocate the
desired control torque to the thrusters. The experiments are conducted with an admissible control
set U = [−0.5, 0.5]3 Nm and considers disturbance torques in W = [−0.02, 0.02]3 Nm.
In the experiment, a 5 degree avoid cone is considered (βmax = 175 degrees). As shown
in Figure 4.4, the avoid cone is constructed in such a way that prevents an onboard laser from
entering a ring placed approximately 18 ft away from the vehicle’s center of rotation. The primary
control input to the vehicle is provided by a human-controlled pilot joystick. The user attempts
to orient the vehicle in such a way that the laser enters the ring, however, the RTA mechanism is
effective at preventing the safety constraint from being violated. That is, the user has full control of
the vehicle when the RTA is inactive, and the RTA activates only as necessary to prevent violations
of the LOS constraint.
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RTA inactive (𝑢 = 𝑢des)
RTA active due to 𝜗1
RTA active due to 𝜗2
Figure 4.5: Comparison of filtered trajectories and RSO projections under nondeterministic input
bounds wmax = 0.01 Nm (top), wmax = 0.03 Nm (middle), wmax = 0.05 Nm (bottom). The
vertical green line indicates the time tk∗ at which the RSO enters Cb.
4.6 Simulated Example
Figure 4.5 shows a simulation of the ASTROS system under a step input udes = [0.5, 0.5, 0.5]T
Nm, now with βmax = 25 degrees and perturbation bounds wmax = 0.01 Nm (top), wmax = 0.03
Nm (middle), wmax = 0.05 Nm (bottom). Here it is seen that increasing wmax results in a more
conservative filter. Specifically, the RTA activates earlier, and a longer integration time is required
before the RSO becomes contained in Cb.
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CHAPTER 5
COLLISION-INCLUSIVE PLANNING FOR FREE-FLYING SPACECRAFT
Collisions may be harnessed as a way to improve the overall safety and navigational effective-
ness of some spacecraft. However, leveraging this capability in autonomous platforms requires
the ability to plan trajectories comprising impulsive contact. This chapter addresses this prob-
lem through the development of a collision-inclusive approach to optimal trajectory planning for
a three degree-of-freedom free-flying spacecraft. First, experimental data are used to formulate a
physically realistic collision model for the spacecraft. It is shown that this model is linear over the
expected operational range, enabling a piecewise affine representation of the full hybrid vehicle dy-
namics. Next, the dynamics model and vehicle constraints are modelled as constraints in a mixed
integer program. Experimental comparisons of trajectories with and without collision-avoidance
requirements demonstrate the capability of the collision-inclusive strategy to achieve significant
performance improvements in realistic scenarios. A simulated case study illustrates the potential
for this approach to find damage-mitigating paths in online implementations.
5.1 Motivation
Assistive robotic spacecraft have the potential to enable the automation of many tasks that are not
well-suited to be directly performed by astronauts; either because they are too dangerous or overly
tedious [138]. Within this context, extravehicular platforms have been proposed for missions such
as on-orbit monitoring [139, 140], component assembly [141], and debris removal [142]. Likewise,
intravehicular assistive robotics [143] are being developed to fulfill many housekeeping duties
inside the International Space Station (ISS). For instance, the Astrobee robot [144], a successor to
NASA’s highly successful SPHERES [145] testbed, has stated goals of (i) providing a microgravity
research platform, (ii) performing mobile camera tasks, and (iii) performing mobile sensor tasks for
environment monitoring and inventory management. As with most mobile autonomous platforms,
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safe and efficient navigation is key to the successful integration of these vehicles into mission
operations.
A popular approach to mobility for microgravity robots is propulsive free-flying. This consists
of expending propellant to actuate movement between periods of free-flight. One may find key re-
sults related to path planning and close proximity operations for this case in [146, 147, 148, 101].
However, a common issue facing this approach is that propellant is often expensive to acquire or
in limited supply. As a consequence of this, fuel-efficiency has become one of the primary per-
formance characteristics for spacecraft. The desire to reduce costs has motivated the development
of two alternate navigation modalities. The first is zero-g climbing [149], where the vehicle uses
grasping contact in the surrounding environment to traverse between locations. A proposed faster
and simpler alternative is the hopping modality [150, 151]. In this case, the vehicle uses a robotic
arm to propel itself between some fixed handrails. While this strategy is attractive in the sense that
it is completely propellantless, it is also more restrictive than the propulsive free-flying strategy
in the sense that it requires the precise coordination of a robotic arm and requires handrails to be
present over the operational region.
This chapter presents a new approach to mobility for assistive spacecraft: supplementation of
propulsive free-flying with planned collisional contact (bouncing). It is shown that this offers a
strategy that is both less restrictive than the propellant-free approaches, and often more efficient
than its collision-free counterpart. In contrast to hopping, where a robotic arm interacts with the
environment to provide the energy needed to change the momentum of the spacecraft, bouncing
achieves similar maneuvers passively though impulsive contact. For example, a spacecraft needing
to redirect itself inside a corridor may do so swiftly with a single well planned collision, rather than
executing the series of maneuvers needed for coordinated hopping. Since the interaction is pas-
sive, bouncing poses very little requirements on the vehicle or the surrounding environment itself.
Hence the main challenge stems from the task of developing an effective motion planning strat-
egy to leverage this capability. Focusing specifically on the case of small, assistive intravehicular
spacecraft, it is assumed that the vehicle operates in the proximity of fixed surfaces with which it
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may collide, and that both the vehicle and the surface are able to withstand low-speed impact.
There is a rich body of work related to impulsive contact in robotics, spanning applications such
as: running [152]; jumping [153]; batting [154]; air hockey [155]; and car following [156], to name
a few. In addition, the problem appears in the aerospace context, within landing [157], docking
[158], grasping [159], and bouncing on planetary bodies [160]. Looking specifically at the case of
vehicle collisions, there has been foundational work in analyzing the stability and robustness of a
colliding vehicle [161], designing vehicles that are tolerant to collisions [162], and even extracting
localization information from instances of impact [163]. Collisions can further be harnessed as a
practical means of improving the effectiveness of trajectories. Through dissipation of energy or
redirection of momentum, colliding agents are endowed with greater maneuverability. One can
observe many examples of this phenomenon in competitive situations e.g. swimming, parkour,
or in nature e.g. animals pushing off of [164] or jumping between objects. However, the use of
planned impulsive contact explicitly for performance gains has only recently been considered in the
context of robot trajectory planning. In [165], the authors use a mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) formulation to derive a time-optimal trajectory incorporating planned collisions for a point
mass. In this chapter, these initial results are utilized to develop a collision-inclusive, optimal
trajectory-planning formulation for in-plane motion of a free-flying spacecraft. Note that since the
overall set of trajectories allowing collisions encompasses all collision-free trajectories as well, the
optimal performance with respect to any objective function must either remain the same or improve
when compared to the case where collisions are always avoided.
In addition to performance benefits, collisions may be utilized to improve the safety of a vehicle
in the presence of observed changes in the surrounding environment. Intuitively: in situations
where collisions cannot be avoided, a safest plan of action incorporating the collision may be
found. Looking specifically at the case of online model predictive control (MPC), hard collision-
avoidance constraints may render the problem infeasible when collisions are unavoidable. This
problem can be addressed by either resorting to a backup controller when the MPC is not feasible
[166] or softening the constraints (i.e. replacing constraints with penalties in the objective function)
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such that feasibility is preserved [167]. This prototypical constraint-softening approach is extended
with the addition of an explicit model of the collision dynamics formulated in the constraints. In
addition to remaining feasible in the presence of an inevitable collision, this allows the vehicle
to plan around the collision, all while minimizing a penalty function that captures the estimated
damage cost. This additional safety measure may offer a particularly useful tool for platforms
proposing autonomous operation in the presence of humans.
The remainder of the chapter is outlined as follows: In Section 5.2, the mathematical prelimi-
naries required to develop the main results are reviewed. In Section 5.3.1 the assumptions on the
spacecraft are introduced and basic dynamical constraints are developed. Experimental collision
data is obtained and used to derive a realistic collision model for the spacecraft in Section 5.3.2.
Section 5.4 uses the motion model and vehicle constraints to specify an optimal strategy for mov-
ing between states. In Section 5.5.1 an experimental case study is described, and the performance
of the collision-inclusive algorithm is compared to that of the collision-free case. It is shown that
the proposed method is capable of significantly reducing a chosen objective function. Finally,
Section 5.5.2 explores potential safety applications with a simulated scenario.
5.2 Representation of Hybrid Systems with Mixed Integer Constraints
MIP allows for the representation of hybrid systems by associating integer variables with the cur-
rent mode of the system. Specifically, integer variables (also known as event variables) allow for
the direct expression of first order logic over the constraints. These variables may be assigned a
unique value based on the location of the state vector, and in turn be used to relax a different set of
constraints over the continuous variables. To demonstrate this, let us consider the following case
where an inequality condition cT z < d is used to activate distinct equality constraints,

a0
T z = b0 if cT z < d
a1
T z = b1 if cT z ≥ d,
(5.1)
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with z, ai, c ∈ Rn, bi, d ∈ R, i = 0, 1. The main tools at our disposal for representing hybrid
systems as programs in the form of Eq. (5.1) come from the lemmas below, which define relation-
ships between implications and inequalities of real and binary decision variables. Let ζ ∈ {0, 1},
z ∈ Z ⊂ Rn, and parameters a, c ∈ Rn, b, d ∈ R. The following results are noted [118, 25, 168, 8]
Lemma 5.2.1. (see [3]) Given M ∈ R such that maxz∈Z(d − cT z) < M , the following are
equivalent:
(i) [cT z < d] =⇒ [ζ = 1] (ii) cT z +Mζ ≥ d
♦
Proof. If maxz∈Z(d − cT z) < M holds, then the statement (ii) is true for all z ∈ Z when ζ = 1.
Given ζ = 0, (ii) is true when cT z < d holds, and is false otherwise. Thus, the truth values for (ii)
are identical to the implication (i) for all assignments.
Lemma 5.2.2. (see [3]) Given M ∈ R such that maxz∈Z(cT z − d) < M , the following are
equivalent:
(i) [ζ = 1] =⇒ [cT z < d] (ii) cT z −M(1− ζ) < d
♦
Proof. If maxz∈Z(cT z−d) < M holds, then (ii) is true for all ζ = 0. Given ζ = 1 (ii) is equivalent
to cT z < d.
The proofs for the above Lemmas may also be made apparent via the form of a truth table. Note
that these can be applied together to form an equivalency. Likewise, application to inequalities of
opposing sense (in conjunction) extends the result to the case of equality constraints.
Lemma 5.2.3. (see [4], Sec. 16.4) Given M ∈ R such that maxz∈Z(aT z − b) < M , the following
are equivalent:
(i) [ζ = 1] =⇒ [aT z = b] (ii) [aT z −M(1− ζ) ≤ b] ∧ [aT z +M(1− ζ) ≥ b]
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♦
Proof. If maxz∈Z(aT z − b) < M holds, then (ii) is trivially satisfied for ζ = 0. Given ζ = 1, (ii)
is equivalent to aT z = b. Equivalence then follows from the truth table.
From here these results may be combined to yield a conjunction of mixed integer inequalities
that is equivalent to Eq. (5.1) over some specified range on z,
Theorem 5.2.1. (see [4], Sec. 16.4) GivenM ∈ R sufficiently large such that max(maxz∈Z(|cT z−
d|),maxz∈Z(aT z − b)) < M holds, then the system (5.1) is equivalent to:
[a0
T z −Mζ ≤ b0] ∧ [a1T z −M(1− ζ) ≤ b1] ∧ [cT z −Mζ < d]
[a0
T z +Mζ ≥ b0] ∧ [a1T z +M(1− ζ) ≥ b1] ∧ [cT z +M(1− ζ) ≥ d]
♦
In practice, the parameterM should be chosen carefully. While values that are too low may not
satisfy the above conditions, excessively large values will decrease computational efficiency, and
may introduce numerical error. For notational simplicity, the sequel uses the same parameter M in
all instances of this method. Note that from a computational viewpoint it is often better to avoid
strict inequalities in implementation. This may be accomplished by using a non-strict inequality
and adding a small number ε to the side with lesser value.
5.3 Vehicle Description and Constraints
The system of interest consists of a single free-flying spacecraft in the presence of one or more
flat surfaces. The spacecraft is subject to input constraints and is restricted to moving within a
plane. The colliding surface is assumed to be fixed and orthogonal to this plane. The collision
model is developed empirically for the specific use case of operation on the robot and testbed at
Stanford’s Space Robotics Facility (see Figure 5.1). A detailed description of this environment and






Figure 5.1: Free-Flyer spacecraft and testbed.
5.3.1 Free Flight Dynamics
The motion of the spacecraft is expressed in an inertial frame FI = (O, î, ĵ, k̂) with right-handed
orthogonal basis vectors î, ĵ lying in the plane of motion and k̂ = î× ĵ. For the testbed shown in
Figure 5.1, the origin O is taken as the lower left corner, î, ĵ lie along the testbed boundary, and k̂
points upwards. The position of the vehicle’s center of massOB with respect toO is s = sx̂i+ syĵ
and the translational velocity is v = vx̂i+ vyĵ. A body frame is defined as FB = (OB, îB, ĵB, k̂B),
with basis vectors îB, and ĵB aligned with the orientation of the thrusters, and k̂B = k̂. The
orientation of FB with respect to FI is θ, with positive increments in the angle θ corresponding to
counterclockwise rotations of the spacecraft, as seen from above. This geometry is illustrated in
Figure 5.3a. The angular velocity of the vehicle is ω = θ̇k̂. The nominal —i.e. collision-free—
spacecraft dynamics1 are then,
s̈x = ux, s̈y = uy, θ̈ = uθ (5.2)
where, ux, uy are the translational accelerations due to applied thrust, and uθ is the rotational
acceleration from an applied moment, which is generated by changes in the reaction wheel speed
from a lower level controller. It is assumed that the thrust inputs are balanced, such that the applied
1The modelling and trajectory planning phases will assume a disturbance-free and deterministic spacecraft model.
Noise, parametric uncertainty, and errors from approximation are to be addressed through online regulation.
97
moment comes entirely from the reaction wheel. For the configuration shown in Figure 5.3a, the









cos (θ) − sin (θ)
sin (θ) cos (θ)
][
0 −1 1 0 0 1 −1 0
−1 0 0 −1 1 0 0 1
]
uT (5.3)
where m is the mass of the spacecraft and uT ∈ [0, uT,max]8 is the vector of individual thruster
output forces. Here uT,max represents the maximum force output of a single thruster.
Note that the thruster arrangements on the spacecraft are such that the maximum accelerations
achievable in the î, ĵ directions are functions of the body orientation θ. This can be simplified with
the use of a conservative inner approximation on the maximum acceleration from thrust umax(θ),
which generates a condition that is uniform (not dependent on orientation) in the inertial frame.
u2x + u
2
y ≤ u2max, umax = min
θ
(umax(θ))) (5.4)
With the present geometry, umax = 2muT,max.
5.3.2 Collision Model
In order to develop a framework for optimizing trajectories that allow collisions, it is necessary to
first develop a model for the collision effects on the spacecraft. Collisions are generally difficult to
understand and model conceptually, as a first principles analysis requires the consideration of many
interacting physical phenomena relating to the geometric, material, and inertial properties of each
body involved; many of which are in themselves difficult to model accurately. Many approaches
that have been proposed to model general collision behavior over a wide range of scenarios [169,
170]. However, since the present case involves a specific pair of objects over a relatively limited
range of conditions, it is desirable to develop an algebraic collision model empirically, by directly
considering the relationship between the velocities immediately before and after the instant of
contact with no thrust commanded. Figure 5.2 shows the effects of 82 individual collisions for the
free-flyer spacecraft and testbed shown in Figure 5.1 . Within the tested range, the data suggest
98
that the changes in rotational velocity (∆ω), translational velocity normal to the wall (∆vN) and
tangent to the wall (∆vT), all follow a linear relationship with the pre-collision normal velocity
(v−N) and relative velocity of the point of contact (v
−
rel). Furthermore, it is observed that for this
set of parameters, effects in the normal direction are uncoupled from the tangential and rotational





















(κT, κN, κω) = (−0.29,−1.43,−5.0), and R is the radius of the spacecraft, measured from the
outer rim to the rotation center. The coefficients are obtained via a least squares regression on the
model error.
If it is assumed that the collision occurs instantaneously, the positions after the collision can
be obtained by integrating the equations of motion with pre-collision velocities until the point of
contact, and post-impact velocities afterward. Let ∆t := ∆t−+∆t+ be the period between the state
measurements, and δ be the effective location of the wall along the orthogonal axis (inflated by R,
as seen in Figure 5.3b). Then the experimental model of Eq. (5.5) yields the following position
update equations,
∆sT = (1 + κT)∆tv
−
T + κTR∆tω
− − κT(v−T +Rω
−)∆t−



















Note that the term ∆t− introduces a nonlinearity in the tangential and rotational update laws.
Making the approximation that collision occurs midway through the interval ∆t− = 0.5∆t allows
us to obtain a linear form of these equations. The bounds on error from this assumption can be









where eT, eN, eθ are the errors in the tangential, normal, and angular directions respectively. Note
that errors vanish both as |v−rel| decreases, and for finer resolutions ∆t. The collision geometry of
the free-flyer system is illustrated in Figure 5.3b.




























Figure 5.2: Observed data from 82 collisions, with linear interpolations taken with respect to the
least squares error.
5.4 Problem Formulation
This section formulates the problem of generating optimal trajectories for a spacecraft in the
presence of (i) an obstacle avoidance region A, composed of NP convex polygons Pk, with
k ∈ {1, ... , NP}, and (ii) surfaces S, S̄ (representing half-planes and convex polygons respec-
tively) with which collisions are permissible. For both P and S, S̄, the conventions used are such






















Figure 5.3: Geometry and conventions for (a) freeflyer spacecraft, (b) collision with a flat wall S.
in R3, and the exterior is the complement of the interior. It is shown that the combined dynam-
ics of the spacecraft, saturation constraints, and obstacle avoidance conditions are all amenable
to approximation with piecewise affine constraints. In light of this, the trajectory optimization
problem is posed as a MIP. The discrete time approximations of the models developed in previous
sections are considered over a horizon of i = 1, ... , τ . The state of the vehicle at the ith time-step
is defined as xTi = [sx,i, sy,i, θi, vx,i, vy,i, ωi], and control vector as u
T
i = [ux,i, uy,i, uθ,i]. For
completeness, some basic control and obstacle avoidance constraint formulations found in [25, 8,
100] are expounded upon.
5.4.1 Obstacle Avoidance and Saturation Constraints
The saturation constraint Eq. (5.4) can be represented by approximating the Euclidean norm with









≤ umax, n = 1, ... , NU, i = 1, ... , τ. (5.10)
While the approximation improves with the number of sides NU, the added constraints may in-
crease the amount of time required to calculate the solution. The aggregate obstacle avoidance
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region A can be constructed from a set of NP convex polygons Pk,
A := {z ∈ R2 |
NP∨
k=1
z ∈ Pk} (5.11)
where
Pk := {z ∈ R2 | cTk,qz < dk,q, q = 1, ... , NQ,k} (5.12)
where ck,q ∈ R2, dk,q ∈ R specify the qth side of the kth polygon, which has NQ,k sides. The
avoidance constraint s 6∈ A can be constructed by defining event variables ψk,q,i ∈ {0, 1} such that
cTk,qsi < dk,q =⇒ ψk,q,i = 1, and ensuring that the position of the vehicle lies in the positive end
(exterior) of at least one of half-spaces defining the walls of each polygonPk. This is accomplished
with the following constraints,
NQ,k∧
q=1
cTk,qsi ≥ dk,q −Mψk,q,i
NQ,k∑
q=1
ψk,q,i ≤ NQ,k − 1,
k = 1, ... , NP, i = 1, ... , τ. (5.13)
Note that each conjunct is an application of Lemma 5.2.1, and the summations enforce the
condition that there is at least one side q in each polygon such that cTk,qsi ≥ dk,q.
Example 5.4.1. Rectangular Boundary Consider the simplified case of a rectangle A = P1 =
{z ∈ R2 | z1 ∈ (zmin1 , zmax1 ), z2 ∈ (zmin2 , zmax2 )}. The equivalent MIP constraints for the condition
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s 6∈ A are,
−sx +Mψ1 ≥ −zmin1
sx +Mψ2 ≥ zmax1
−sy +Mψ1 ≥ −zmin2





5.4.2 Representing Dynamics in the Presence of a Single Collision Surface
For notational simplicity, it is assumed for this case that the basis vectors of FI are oriented with
the wall S so that ĵ points away from the wall, î is tangent, and k̂ = î× ĵ remains pointed upwards
(see Figure 5.3b). The discrete time equations of motion are given by,
xi+1 − xi =

Axi +Bui if ζi+1 = 0
Acxi + bc if ζi+1 = 1 ,
i = 1, ... , τ − 1 (5.14)














and Ac, bc represent the collision dynamics,
Ac =

0 0 0 (1 + 0.5κT)∆t 0 0.5κTR∆t
0 κN 0 0 (1 + κN)∆t 0
0 0 0 0.5κω∆t 0 (1 + 0.5κωR)∆t
0 0 0 κT 0 κTR
0 0 0 0 κN 0












The period between steps i and i−1 is ∆t, which is assumed to remain constant over all iterations.
Let the wall be located at a distance δ′ from the origin of the inertial frame FI , and define
δ := δ′+R, where R is the radius of the spacecraft, measured from the rotation center to the point
of contact. Then the wall can be defined by the set S := {z ∈ R2 | z2 < δ}. The occurrence of
a collision can be associated with an event variable ζi ∈ {0, 1}. This triggers the switch between
the nominal and collision dynamics; it is activated (equal to one) on an iteration i if the nominal
dynamics predict that the vehicle will enter S on that iteration, i.e.
sy,i + vy,i∆t+ uy,i0.5∆t
2 < δ ⇐⇒ ζi+1 = 1, i = 1, ... , τ − 1 (5.17)
Using Lemmas 5.2.1, 5.2.2, Eq. (5.17) can be expressed with the equivalent set of constraints,
sy,i + vy,i∆t+ uy,i0.5∆t
2 +Mζi+1 ≥ δ
sy,i + vy,i∆t+ uy,i0.5∆t
2 −M(1− ζi+1) < δ
i = 1, ... , τ − 1 (5.18)
and from Theorem 5.2.1, it is clear that Eq. (5.14) is equivalent to,
xi+1 − xi − Axi −Bui +MI6ζi+1 ≥ 0
xi+1 − xi − Axi −Bui −MI6ζi+1 ≤ 0
xi+1 − xi − Acxi − bc +MI6(1− ζi+1) ≥ 0
xi+1 − xi − Acxi − bc −MI6(1− ζi+1) ≤ 0,




















Figure 5.4: Example geometry for triangular collision polygon S̄.
Note that collisions may have the undesirable effect of imparting an external moment onto
the spacecraft. While this may be useful for translating stored angular momentum into lateral
momentum in safety critical scenarios, it could also lead to saturation of the reaction wheels over
time. As such, it may be desirable to minimize momentum transfer by constraining the relative
velocity of the contact point to zero at the time of collision: ζi = 1 =⇒ vrel,i = 0 . Equivalently,
from Lemma 5.2.3,
vx,i +Rωi −M(1− ζi) ≤ 0
vx,i +Rωi +M(1− ζi) ≥ 0
i = 2, ... , τ. (5.20)
Note that meeting this condition preserves the initial tangential and angular velocity over the col-
lision.
5.4.3 Representing Dynamics in the Presence of Polygonal Collision Surfaces
At the expense of introducing some complexity, collision surfaces S can be generalized from half-
planes to convex polygons,
S̄ := {z ∈ R2 | aTj z < bj , j = 1, ... , NS̄} (5.21)
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where NS̄ is the number of sides in the polygon and the indices j label the walls in a counterclock-
wise order. In contrast to the previous case, the basis vectors î, ĵ are not restricted to a particular
orientation. It is assumed that the vehicle collides into the jth wall of S̄ on iteration i if: (i) the
position at timestep i−1 is closest to the boundary of the jth wall, and (ii) the nominal update equa-
tion predicts that the vehicle will enter the interior of S̄ on iteration i. It is convenient to represent
the second condition as s̃i := Asxi−1 + Bsui−1 ∈ S̄, where As, Bs are the first two rows of A, B,
corresponding to the position update under the nominal dynamics. Likewise the first condition can
be represented as si−1 ∈ Cj where Cj is the region exterior to the polygon, closest to wall j. This
can be defined as,
Cj := {z ∈ R2 |αTj z < βj , αTσ(j)z ≥ βσ(j) , aTj z ≥ bj } (5.22)
where σ(j) is the jth element of σ := (NS̄ , 1, 2, ... , NS̄ − 1), and αj, βj define the half-space
bisecting wall j and the next wall in the counterclockwise rotation, such that αTj z < βj is satisfied
for points closer to the jth edge. An example configuration is shown in Figure 5.4.
The goal is to define event variables Ξi,j ∈ {0, 1} to indicate the occurrence of collisions.
Specifically, it is desired that Ξi,j = 1 when a collision occurs with the jth wall on iteration i,
Ξi,j = 1 ⇐⇒ s̃i ∈ S̄ ∧ si−1 ∈ Cj, i = 2, ... , τ, j = 1, ... , NS̄ . (5.23)
These indicator variables may then be used to activate the collision dynamics for the wall involved
in the collision. In order to indicate the position with respect to the walls (aj, bj) defining the
polygon S̄, the following constraints are introduced
aTj s̃i +Mγi,j ≥ bj
aTj s̃i −M(1− γi,j) < bj
i = 2, ... , τ, j = 1, ... , NS̄ . (5.24)
This fixes γi,j = 1 exactly when the constraint aTj s̃i < bj is satisfied (i.e. γi,j = 1 ⇐⇒ aTj s̃i < bj).
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Constraints of the same form can be used to indicate the position of the vehicle with respect to the
half-spaces defined by (αj, βj),
αTj si +Mλi,j ≥ βj
αTj si −M(1− λi,j) < βj
i = 2, ..., τ, j = 1, ... , NS̄ (5.25)
which expresses λi,j = 1 ⇐⇒ αTj s̃i < βj for the appropriate values of i, j. The equivalencies in
Eq. (5.23) can then be enforced by the constraints,
NS̄∑
p=1
γi,p + λi−1,j − λi−1,σ(j) − γi−1,j +M(1− Ξi,j) ≥ NS̄ + 1
NS̄∑
p=1
γi,p + λi−1,j − λi−1,σ(j) − γi−1,j −MΞi,j ≤ NS̄
(5.26)
which is applied for i = 2, ... , τ , j = 1, ... , NS̄ .
The dynamics for this system are then,




j=1 Ξi+1,j ≤ 0
Ajcxi + b
j
c if Ξi+1,j = 1, j = 1, ... , NS̄ ,
i = 1, ... , τ − 1 (5.27)
where Ajc, b
j
c are the collision dynamics for the j
th wall. To represent these dynamics, let us first
define a local frame for the jth wall F jw = (O, t̂j, âj, k̂) with t̂j, âj pointing tangent and normal to
wall j, and k̂j = t̂j × âj upwards. Each local frame is a rotation of FI = (O, î, ĵ, k̂) about k̂ by
an angle φj . Let L3(φj) ∈ R3×3 be the rotation matrix converting vectors in FI to vectors in F jw.
The collision dynamics for each wall in FI can be expressed by rotating the position and velocity





c = Λj[0, −κN
bj
‖aj‖2









The dynamics in Eq. (5.27) are then represented by the following MIP constraints,












xi+1 − xi − Ajcxi − bjc −MΞi+1,j ≤ 0
xi+1 − xi − Ajcxi − bjc +MΞi+1,j ≥ 0
j = 1, ... , NS̄ (5.30)
which are applied at i = 1, ... , τ − 1.
5.4.4 Example Objective Functions
In practice, the appropriate choice of an objective function depends on the specific needs of the
mission. The proposed methodology does not assume a particular form for the objective. However,
since vehicle efficiency is commonly of critical importance to real-world missions, it is useful
to review here two common approximations for penalizing actuation using quadratic and linear




(u2x, i + u
2
y, i) (5.31)
which forms a Mixed Integer Quadratic Program (MIQP). With the introduction of additional
constraints, is also possible to use a PWA approximation of the Euclidean norm of commanded















, i = 1, ... , τ. (5.32)
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The constraints here approximate the second order cone constraints
Gi ≥ ‖[ux,i, uy,i]‖2, i = 1, ... , τ (5.33)
with an NJ sided polygon.
5.5 Applications and Case Studies
The potential benefits of the proposed approach are demonstrated through two case studies. First,
the problem formulation developed in Section 5.4 is validated on hardware. The effectiveness
of the approach in improving upon a chosen objective function is studied through a comparison
between collision-inclusive and collision-free trajectories. Results are tabulated for both ideal and
experimental cases. Next, a simulated example provides a qualitative demonstration of how the
collision-inclusive planner may be applied in safety-critical applications.
5.5.1 Experimental Performance Comparison
Description of Hardware and Testbed
Experiments were conducted for this work in the Stanford Space Robotics Facility on the free-
flyer spacecraft robot testbed. A set of robots is designed to hover frictionlessly on air bearings,
thus emulating microgravity dynamics in the plane of a table. Though previous generations of
the free-flyer robot used in this experiment operated on compressed air [171], the current iteration
of the free-flyer operates on CO2, owing to CO2’s ability to be stored in liquid form at room
temperature at only 1000 psi, resulting in a much higher fuel density than can be achieved at
comparable pressures with compressed air. The robots are also equipped with actuators commonly
used in spacecraft, namely a reaction wheel for attitude control and 8 cold-gas thrusters primarily
for translational control. Due to high capacity of the CO2 tanks, the robots can perform aggressive
thrust maneuvers for over an hour and can hover without thrust for over 10 hours continuously.
The robots use an Odroid XU4 for its primary on-board computation, as well as an mbed
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Table 5.1: Free-flyer spacecraft parameters.
Parameter Value Unit
average mass (m) 18.08 kg
radius (R) 0.157 m
max individual thruster output (uT,max) 0.20 N
body inertia about spin axis (Ib) 0.184 kgm2
reaction wheel inertia (Iw) 0.029 kgm2
max acceleration of reaction wheel 0.628 rad/s2
reaction wheel speed range [60,340] RPM
Microcontroller for low-level control of various subsystems. Additionally, the free-flyer software
stack is implemented in ROS and is connected to an off-board hub computer, where more heavy
computation can be run as needed for planning and control. The ROS stack also gives access to
real-time data from a motion-capture system, giving position and velocity information at 120 Hz.
The granite table used for experiments is 9’ × 12’ —approximately 2.74 m × 3.66 m— allowing
ample room for complex planning scenarios. Further parameters for the free-flyer robot can be
found in Table 5.1, where average mass is reported due to variations in the state of the tanks.
Performance Comparison
The spacecraft and testbed described in the above section are considered with S taken as the lower
wall of the testbed and the origin of FI at the lower left corner, as shown in Figs. 5.1, 5.5. Per-
formance is compared for vehicles navigating from rest at initial position s1 = [0.41m, 2.29m]T to
rest at final position sτ = [3.15m, 2.29m]T , while remaining in the boundary of the testbed, and
avoiding a central rectangular region P = {z ∈ R2 | z1 ∈ [1.45, 2.12], z2 ∈ [0.57, 2.74]}. The cost
J1 introduced in Eq. (5.31) is minimized. The performances of the vehicle are compared both in
terms of this approximation, and a fuel cost measured through pulse width modulation (PWM) sig-
nals sent to the thruster. Assuming constant mass flow rate through the thrusters, the latter cost is
directly proportional to fuel consumption. The relative velocity of the contact point is constrained
to zero in order to minimize angular momentum transfer with the wall (Eq. (5.20)). A small penalty
on angular velocity is also included to reduce unnecessary spin of the spacecraft, which, due to the
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of paths taken in experimental scenarios.
111
limited update rate of the thrust controller —approximately 2 Hz— may diminish the accuracy of
acceleration commands.
The trajectory is generated with Gurobi optimization software using the formulation in Sec-
tion 5.4 with the parameters listed above. The thrust saturation constraint Eq. (5.4) uses NU = 20
sides in the approximation. To ensure that regulation is possible in the presence of disturbances,
the MIP limits the maximum acceleration (umax) to 90% of its theoretical value. The ideal state is
tracked using a Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) as the ancillary control law. The net control at
time t ∈ R is,
u(t) = u∗(t) +Klqr(x
∗(t)− x(t)) (5.34)
where Klqr = [2.86 I3, 14.43 I3] ∈ R3×6 is the LQR gain matrix, and u∗ ∈ R3, x∗ ∈ R6 are the
ideal control and state at time t, taken from a polynomial interpolation of the control and state
solutions returned from the MIP. The input u is then mapped to PWM signals on the thrusters
upwm = uT/uT,max ∈ [0, 1]8. This mapping is derived by taking the pseudo-inverse of the mapping
from individual thruster forces to forces in the body frame. The resulting mixing equation is
balanced in the body frame, ensuring that no moment is produced from the thrusters. An inner PID
loop regulates the speed of the reaction wheel, which is used to achieve the desired moment.
Experiments are conducted for this scenario with the time-horizons fixed to 45 and 60 seconds.
The experimental update rate of the controller varies slightly from the fixed 0.5s period assumed
in the planning phase. As a consequence of this, the 45 s experiments are both completed in 82
steps, and the collision-free and collision-inclusive 60 s experiments are completed in 108 and
109 steps respectively. The trajectories taken are shown in Figure 5.5, and the efficiency measures
are plotted against time in Figure 5.6. A video comparison of two experiments may be found in
[172]. Note that despite having a significant effect on the total cost, the difference in time allocated
to reach the goal has virtually no effect on the shape of the planned path. Table 5.2 shows the
total costs for each experiment, along with the corresponding ideal values, and the resulting PWM
costs. It is apparent that the collision-inclusive approach is capable of demonstrating significant
improvements in overall efficiency for a given time horizon. In particular, reductions in the J1
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Figure 5.6: Costs vs time for collision-free (red) and collision-inclusive (blue) experiments, and
corresponding ideal values (transparent) for the J1 cost.
cost of 44.3% and 22.9% are seen for the 45 s and 60 s experiments respectively (compared to
47.8%, and 41.2% for the ideal case), and reductions of 31.7% and 23.8% in the PWM cost for the
45 s and 60 s experiments respectively. The main boost in efficiency occurs midway through the
trajectory. As the collision-free vehicle requires increased thrust to reduce its velocity and redirect
its momentum, the collision-inclusive approach allows the spacecraft to minimize its thrust at this
point, gaining the required momentum transfer directly from an impulsive force at the wall. There
appears to be some trade-off when using this approach in that a spike in thrust is seen to occur
directly after collision. This might be attributed to a number of factors which could potentially
lead to increased model error on the collision iteration. For example: sensitivity to modelling
the precise location of the wall (δ) or vehicle radius (R); to precisely matching the commanded
tangential and angular velocities at the time of collision; or from the zero thrust approximation












Figure 5.7: Original (green) and updated (red) paths taken to evade observed obstacle (left) [173];
composite trajectory (right).
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Table 5.2: Experiment cost values.
Specification Experimental J1 Cost [m2/s4] Ideal J1 Cost [m2/s4] Experimental PWM Cost [s]
Collision-Free, 45s 0.01822 0.01619 65.04
Collision-Inclusive, 45s 0.01014 0.00845 44.42
Collision-Free, 60s 0.00633 0.00611 43.76
Collision-Inclusive, 60s 0.00488 0.00359 33.33
5.5.2 Application to Safety-Critical Systems
If collision avoidance is posed as a hard constraint in the problem formulation, then online MPC
becomes vulnerable to being rendered infeasible in situations where collisions can no longer be
avoided. This situation might arise from a number of factors including model error, external per-
turbations, or movement of objects in the environment. The problem is exacerbated by the ten-
dency of optimal trajectories to lie near the boundary of the infeasible region (see for example,
Figure 5.5). On the other hand, if the constraint to avoid collisions is replaced by a term in the
cost function capturing the damage from this event, and the effects of the collision are considered
in the constraints, then the planner can not only remain feasible, but direct the vehicle toward an
optimal mitigating action. A simulated scenario is considered in this section for the purpose of
demonstrating the potential of the collision-inclusive planner to bring about enhanced safety in
this sense.
Consider the spacecraft and parameters as described in previous sections, now given the task
of traversing across a larger, more cluttered environment, consisting of a number of walls whose
locations are known to it via an internal map. The vehicle also performs online sensing which
it may use to detect unmapped objects in the environment. Collision with the walls is known
to cause minor damage to the robot, while collision with a newly detected object is considered
more damaging, as neither the type of object nor consequences of hitting it are known in advance.
The two strategies for this case are now compared in the environment shown in Figure 5.7. Here
the spacecraft (with parameters from previous sections) is given the goal of reaching the point in
the top right corner while avoiding obstacles. The vehicle starts on the green trajectory shown
in Figure 5.7, however, the vehicle eventually detects the presence of a new obstacle (red box)
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obstructing the original path, and is not able to stop in time to prevent collision. If collision
avoidance with the obstacles is posed as a hard constraint, then the MPC is rendered infeasible.
Without an update, the vehicle may simply continue on its original course and hit the object at
high velocity. A more thoughtful implementation might include a backup controller that brings the
vehicle to rest as quickly as possible, however even this backup strategy will result in inevitable
and uncontrolled collisions with both the wall and obstacle [25].
As an alternate strategy, the presence of the various objects in the program may be incorporated
through penalties in a multi-objective cost function. The total cost J will be taken as the sum of
some nominal cost Jnom (e.g. fuel consumption) and a damage cost Jdam. Here the damage cost is
taken to be a weighted sum of the speeds at the time of impact, defined for the jth wall on the ith
iteration as follows,




where Ξi,j = 1 indicates collision with wall defined by aj on iteration i. Note that impact speed is
a quadratic function of the problem variables. Letting σ1 be the set of indices for the mapped walls
(blue) and σ2 be the indices for the unmapped walls (red). Then the total cost as J = Jnom + Jdam
















where, K1, K2 ∈ R weight the collision penalties for each type of object. For this situation, it is
specified that K1 is much less than K2, directing to vehicle to avoid the unknown object as much
as possible. The red path in the Figure 5.7 shows the new trajectory that is calculated using this
cost function once the red box is first detected—i.e. accounted for in the motion planning. Here
the spacecraft is able to leverage the collision dynamics with the blue box to avoid collision with
the unknown obstacle altogether. In addition to simply applying thrust to push itself away from
the object, the vehicle increases its angular speed before the collision, and utilizes stored angular
momentum to push itself away on impact. Additional simulation parameters are listed in [94]. A
116
video of the simulation may be found at [173].
5.6 Discussion
The formulation may be further developed through consideration of more complex environments
or vehicle geometries, either of which may require the construction of a more complex collision
model. The results of the trajectory planning may be sensitive to the accuracy of the collision
model and other parameters. New regulation strategies may be explored to reduce the loss in
efficiency in the time samples surrounding the collision, and to make the strategy more robust to
parametric uncertainty. The basic framework for optimizing around collisions may be adapted to
applications such as docking or landing, or alternate vehicle platforms such as quad-copters. A key
focus of future research will be to expand on the applications toward safety though the creation
and implementation of damage minimizing backup controllers. Though the proposed framework is
capable of generating the necessary trajectories, the current implementation of the MPC may not be
able to generate the aggressive paths quickly enough to be practical for online use. In order to make
this more tractable, a learning approach may be utilized to approximate the policy of the collision-
inclusive backup controller. Once this has been achieved, the backup strategy may be validated
in an experimental scenario. As an alternate safety application, the enhanced maneuverability of
the collision-inclusive MPC may be leveraged in a controlled set invariance framework such as the
one presented in [174, 23].
If the proposed approach is to be applied in orbit, and over longer timescales, then one may
consider replacing the double integrator model with Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) dynamics
[101, 175]. Since this model is linear, the nominal dynamics may be incorporated directly into the
form presented in Eq. (5.14) and (5.27). In this case, one would either need to modify the collision
update equations to account for the new dynamics, or for the errors introduced if the perturbation
is neglected between the time steps surrounding the collision. A general extension of the planner
to the 6 degree-of-freedom case may potentially be challenging. However, it is important to note
that for planar (2-D) and spatial (3-D) operations, the coupling terms between the attitude and
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translational dynamics disappear during collision if the relative velocity at the point of contact goes
to zero. Hence, once could in principle use this approach to plan trajectories for the translational
states, and delegate the task of rotating the spacecraft to match the relative velocity of the wall to a
separate, lower-level controller. Similarly, one might simplify the spatial case formulation in a way
that allows some of the translation-attitude coupling to be leveraged by constraining the robot to




In order to fully realize the value offered by cyber-physical systems, it is necessary to ensure that
these systems avoid taking actions that could be harmful to themselves, their environments, or
that would result in a failure of the mission. The objective of this research is to strengthen the
framework behind safety in control and decision making, with an emphasis on utilizing the tools
provided by numerical optimization, and on applications to problems in the space domain. The
approach to safety is centered around Run Time Assurance (RTA), which relates to a control archi-
tecture that decouples the problem of enforcing safety constraints from the problem of optimizing
performance objectives. Importantly, since an RTA approach is adopted, the results in this research
are in general, complementary to those in performance-related research.
The first chapter presents a review on fundamental concepts related to optimization and safety-
critical control. The second chapter provides a tutorial on RTA, and presents canonical approaches
in this area. The remaining chapters address safety problems for three spacecraft systems: (i)
Autonomous Rendezvous Proximity Operations and Docking (ARPOD) subject to collision avoid-
ance constraints, (ii) attitude control subject to line-of-sight constraints, and (iii) utilizing planned
collisions for safety and performance in free-flying spacecraft.
The contributions of this dissertation are described as follows. First, in Chapter 2, a study of
RTA approaches is used to synthesize a novel RTA taxonomy. A set of canonical algorithms is iden-
tified, and various trade-offs are discussed among the approaches presented. Next, in Chapter 3,
an optimal guidance and control framework is presented for safety-constrained optimal transfer
trajectories to a safe set of closed natural motion trajectories under the Clohessy–Wiltshire-Hill dy-
namics. The planning problem is posed as a mixed integer program, which can be solved to global
optimality under certain fuel- and power-minimizing cost functions. The algorithm is shown to be
effective for enforcing safety in an RTA framework. In Chapter 4, a novel approach is presented for
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enforcing safety constraints under nondeterministic dynamics, and this approach is applied to the
problem of enforcing line-of-sight constraints for a torque-controlled spacecraft. The algorithm
relies on computing reachable sets under a recovery maneuver online, and determining whether all
realizations of the recovery maneuver safely reach an invariant backup set centered around a safe
pointing direction. Finally, Chapter 5 introduces an approach to optimizing trajectories comprising
planned collisions, and applies this to a three degree-of-freedom free-flying spacecraft. The plan-
ning algorithm integrates an empirically derived collision model into the constraints of a mixed
integer program. Experiments comparing the efficiency of collision-free and collision-inclusive
trajectories provide a proof-of-concept demonstration of the approach’s capability to bring about
practical performance enhancements. Moreover, a simulated case study shows the potential for
application of the method as an online safety measure.
The research presents the possibility for many promising future directions. The theory of RTA
may be generalized to consider more classification criteria, the effects of perception, reaction to
component failures, or to system level concerns, such as the interaction between multiple layers.
Furthermore, progress stands to be made on this front in terms of strengthening the theory for
nondeterministic and stochastic systems. It would be interesting to consider a deeper analysis on
the role of machine learning or artificial intelligence in the construction of backup controllers; e.g.
it may be possible to use reinforcement learning for a backup controller that protects the system
while it explores. In this research, safety filters are constructed for the translational and rotational
states of a spacecraft separately. One next step would be to design and test an RTA mechanism for
a combined 6 degree-of-freedom spacecraft model. The collision-inclusive planning may also be
generalized to a 6 degree-of-freedom model, or applied to other systems, such as aerial robots. Ad-
ditionally, there is much left to be considered in terms of designing practical damage-minimizing
RTA systems. For example, the theory behind this may be extended to a broader class of systems,
or to other applications such as road vehicles. One may also consider alternative planning strate-
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